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Abstract
A mediator is a mechanism that can only suggest actions to players, as a function of
all agents’ reported types, in a given game of incomplete information. We study what
is achievable by two kinds of mediators, “strong” and “weak.” Players can choose to
opt-out of using a strong mediator but cannot misrepresent their type if they opt-in.
Such a mediator is “strong” because we can view it as having the ability to verify player
types. Weak mediators lack this ability— players are free to misrepresent their type
to a weak mediator. We show a striking result—in a prior-free setting, assuming only
that the game is large and players have private types, strong mediators can implement
approximate equilibria of the complete-information game. If the game is a congestion
game, then the same result holds using only weak mediators. Our result follows from a
novel application of differential privacy, in particular, a variant we propose called joint
differential privacy.
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2
1 Introduction
Mechanism design generally supposes a principal who can greatly influence the “rules of
the game” among agents, to achieve a desirable outcome. In several applied settings of
interest, however, this sort of influence is too much to hope for. For example, a market
designer may have to live within the constraints of an existing market. She may be unable
to guarantee that players participate in her designed mechanism, or that they follow the
outcomes proposed even if they do participate. Similarly, in many settings, transfers may
be ruled out.1 To distinguish these principals of limited power from the standard principals
considered in the literature, we refer to them as “mediators.” In this paper, we study what
sorts of outcomes are achievable by mediators.
To be more precise, given a game of incomplete information, a mediator may only collect
reports from players, and then suggest actions to each player. That is, we augment a given
game with an additional option for each player to use a mediator. If a player opts in to using
the mediator, and reveals her type, then it will suggest an action for that player to take (as a
possibly stochastic function of all reports it received). We further require that mediators be
robust or prior-free, i.e. that the mediator’s recommendations (and the incentives of players
to follow them) do not rely on the knowledge (or even existence) of any prior distribution
over types.
Our main results are to show that it is possible to construct a robust mediator under
very mild assumptions, namely, that the game is large and that the setting is one of private
values. For every profile of realized types, our mediator suggests to each player her action
in an approximate equilibrium of the realized full-information game. Further, we show that
opting in to using the mediator, and following its recommendation forms an approximate
ex-post Nash equilibrium of the mediated game. The error of the approximation vanishes as
the number of players grows.
The techniques used in our construction may be of independent interest. We propose
and use a novel variant of the influential notion of differential privacy, which we term joint
differential privacy. In particular, we devise an algorithm for computing equilibria of a full-
information game such that any single player’s reported type to the algorithm only has a
small effect on the distribution of suggested actions to all other players, in the worst case over
the reports of all players (it is this worst case guarantee that yields prior-free robustness).
1A leading example is the central matching clearinghouses proposed for matching markets such as
school choice, residency markets etc. Agents are free to drop out and contract on their own before
the match, or indeed may deviate from the proposed match, and there are no transfers. A more recent
example, closer to our model concerns the design of traffic-aware smartphone routing apps. Again, agents are
free to not use the app, or may even try to mislead the app to get favorable routes. For a recent case study, see
http://www.wsj.com/articles/in-l-a-one-way-to-beat-traffic-runs-into-backlash-1447469058.
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Ideas from the differential privacy literature allow us to precisely control the amount by
which any single agent’s type influences the suggested actions to others, and hence allows us
to ensure our desired incentive properties. In other words, we prove our incentive guarantees
for our mechanism by showing that it is differentially private, a technique that may be useful
in other settings.
In this paper, we consider two kinds of mediators, which we call weak, and strong me-
diators, that extend the original game. For both types of mediators, players may simply
opt out of using the mediator and play the original game using any strategy they choose.
Similarly, for both types of mediators, if they opt in to using the mediator, they are under no
obligation to follow the action suggested to them, and can use the suggestion to act however
they like. If the mediator is weak, then agents can also arbitrarily misrepresent their type
to the mediator. In contrast, if players opt in to using a strong mediator, then they cannot
misrepresent their type (equivalently, strong mediators have the ability to verify a player’s
type given that she opted in, which is why we term them “strong”). In all cases, we assume
that the mediator has very limited power—it cannot modify payoffs of the game (i.e. make
payments) or enforce that any player take any particular action.
Under only the assumptions that the original game is “large,” and that types are private,
we show that it is possible to implement a correlated equilibrium of the complete-information
game using a strong mediator.2 Informally, a game is large if there are many players and any
player individually has only a small effect on the utility of any other player. Remarkably, no
further assumptions on the game (e.g. single crossing properties) are required. We show that
in such games there exists a strong mediator such that it is an approximate ex-post Nash
equilibrium for every player to opt in to using the mediator, and then faithfully follow the
suggested action of the mediator. In particular, this behavior forms a Bayes-Nash equilibrium
for any prior on agent types, since it is an ex-post Nash equilibrium. Moreover, when players
follow this strategy, the resulting play forms an approximate correlated equilibrium of the
complete-information game.
We also show that for more structured large games—in particular, congestion games—it
is possible to implement an approximate Nash equilibrium of the complete-information game
using only a weak mediator. Congestion games are examples of potential games, introduced
by Monderer & Shapley (1996). They describe them thus:
“The class of congestion games is, on the one hand, narrow, but on the other
hand, very important for economics. Any game where a collection of homo-
geneous agents have to choose from a finite set of alternatives, and where the
2To be precise, we only guarantee that our mediator will select some approximate equilibrium of the
realized continuum, not that the designer has control over what equilibrium is selected.
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payoff of a player depends on the number of players choosing each alternative, is
a congestion game.” (Monderer & Shapley 1996)
In fact, they show that the class of potential games is isomorphic to the class of congestion
games.3 For congestion games, we construct a weak mediator such that it is an approximate
ex-post Nash equilibrium for every player to opt into using the mediator, truthfully report
their type, and then faithfully follow the mediator’s suggested action, and when players do
so, the resulting play forms an approximate Nash equilibrium of the complete-information
game. In both of these results, the approximation error tends to 0 as the number of players
grows.
A tempting approach to obtaining our results is to consider the following mediator. The
mediator accepts a report of each agent’s type, which defines an instance of a complete-
information game. It then computes an equilibrium (either Nash or correlated) of the full-
information game, and suggests an action to each player which is a draw from this equi-
librium distribution. By definition of an equilibrium, if all players opt-in to the mediator
and truthfully report their type, then they can do no better than subsequently following the
recommended action. However, this mediator does not solve the problem, as it may not be
in a player’s best interest to opt in, even if the other n− 1 players do opt in! Intuitively, by
opting out, the player can cause the mediator to compute an equilibrium of the wrong game,
or to compute a different equilibrium of the same game. More specifically, by opting out of
the mechanism, a player can have a substantial effect on the computed equilibrium, even if
each player has only small effect on the utilities of other players. That is, in the absence of
other guarantees, the mediator itself might be quite unstable to individual agent reports. A
similar argument applies to misreports to a weak mediator.
The task, then, is to find a stable way to compute equilibria of the underlying game that
is insensitive to any single player’s report. We show that this can be done for approximate
correlated equilibria of any large game, and approximate Nash equilibria of large congested
games. Specifically, in Section 3, we argue that algorithms which (1) are jointly differentially
private, and (2) compute approximate equilibria of the underlying complete information
game provides appropriate incentives. Then in Sections 4 and 5 we provide an algorithm
for computing an approximate Nash equilibrium in large congestion games subject to joint
differential privacy and an algorithm for computing an approximate correlated equilibrium
subject to joint differential privacy in any large game, respectively.
3However, the mapping from potential games to congestion games they exhibit yields a game with a
number of actions that is exponential in the number of players in the game. Our results in contrast require
that the number of alternatives be small relative to the number of players, and so we do not obtain positive
results for the entire class of potential games, but only for those potential games that can be expressed
concisely as congestion games.
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In Section 6 we argue that our results for general large games are tight in several senses we
make precise. In particular, we show that, in general, (1) there do not exist mediators that
implement exact rather than approximate equilibria, (2) it is not possible to achieve more
exact equilibria than what we achieve without employing substantially different techniques,
and (3) that mediators that provide strong welfare guarantees are computationally infeasible.
We argue that in certain games, our mediators achieve good (utilitarian) social welfare.
Finally, we discuss why privately computing a correlated equilibrium is not sufficient to
implement a weak mediator, even though it is sufficient to implement a strong mediator, and
why instead it is necessary to privately compute a Nash equilibrium in order to implement
a weak mediator.
1.1 Related Work and Discussion
Market and Mechanism Design Our work is related to the substantial body of lit-
erature on mechanism/market design in “large games.” In this literature, the largeness
enables mechanisms to have good incentive properties, even when the small market ver-
sions do not. It stretches back to Roberts & Postlewaite (1976) who showed that market
(Walrasian) equilibria are approximately strategy proof in large economies. More recently
Immorlica & Mahdian (2005), Kojima & Pathak (2009), Kojima et al. (2010) have shown
that various two-sided matching mechanisms are approximately strategy proof in large mar-
kets. There are similar results in the literature for one-sided matching markets, market
economies, and double auctions. The most general result is that of Azevedo & Budish (2011)
who design incentive compatible mechanisms for large economies that satisfy a smoothness
assumption.
One salient aspect of our work in relation to most of this literature is that we make
substantially less restrictive assumptions. We do not assume anything about how player
types are generated (e.g. we make no distributional assumptions, and do not assume a
replication economy), we do not assume anything about the structure of equilibria in the
games we study, and our results give non-trivial bounds when the number of players is small
(our bounds are non-trivial even when the number of players is much smaller than the size
of the type space, for example).
Inspired by applied market design settings such as the medical resident match, other pa-
pers have also observed that a designer may have limited ability to affect/ limit participants’
actions in a pre-existing market, and this should be taken into account in the design—see
e.g. Roth & Shorrer (2015).
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Large Games Our results hold under a “largeness condition”, i.e. a player’s unilateral
deviation can affect the payoff of others by only a small amount. This is closely related to the
literature on large games, see e.g. Al-Najjar & Smorodinsky (2000) or Kalai (2004). There
has been recent work studying large games using tools from theoretical computer science,
studying robustness of equilibrium concepts, see Gradwohl & Reingold (2008, 2010). Our
results can be interpreted as a structural result about large normal form games: there exists
a family of approximate equilibria in all large games that are stable to changing any single
player’s payoffs in the game (the joint distribution of all other players’ actions does not
change much).
Communication There has been some previous work on mediators in games Monderer & Tennenholtz
(2003, 2009). This line of work aims to modify the equilibrium structure of full-information
games by introducing a mediator, which can coordinate agent actions if they choose to opt in
using the mediator. Mediators can be used to convert Nash equilibria into dominant strategy
equilibria, or implement equilibria that are robust to collusion. While the setting is substan-
tially different, qualitatively, our mediators are weaker in that they cannot make payments
(Monderer & Tennenholtz 2003), or enforce actions (Monderer & Tennenholtz 2009).
Our mediators are closer to the communication devices in the “communication equilibria”
of Forges (1986). Her mediators are prior dependent, and she focuses on characterizing the set
of payoffs achievable via such mediators. No attention is paid to computational tractability.
As was recently noted by Cummings et al. (2015),4 the results reported here and in that
work can be viewed as giving robust versions of the communication equilibria of Forges
(1986), in the sense that we can implement an approximate equilibrium of the complete
information game using a “direct revelation mediator,” but without needing the existence
of a prior distribution on types. Compared to the former, in which truthful reporting is a
Bayes-Nash Equilibrium, truth-telling here forms an ex-post Nash equilibrium. We include
a summary of this view of our results in Table 1.
Differential Privacy Differential privacy was first defined by Dwork, McSherry, Nissim & Smith
(2006), and is now the standard privacy “solution concept” in the theoretical computer sci-
ence literature. It was introduced to quantify the worst-case harm that can befall an indi-
vidual from allowing his data to be used in a computation, as compared to if he did not
provide his data. It is useful in our context because it provides a stability guarantee on
the distribution of outputs induced by a mechanism with respect to small changes in its
4They extend our techniques to design weak mediators for aggregative games. These are games in which
every player’s payoff is a function of the player’s own action and a low-dimensional aggregate of all players’
actions.
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Mechanism Class of Common Mediator Solution Ex-post
Games Prior? Strength Concept Realization
Forges (1986) Any Yes Weak Bayes-Nash —
This work Large No Strong Ex-post Correlated
Nash Eqbm
This work Large No Weak Ex-post Nash
Congestion Nash Eqbm
Cummings et al. (2015) Aggregative No Weak Ex-post Nash
Nash Eqbm
Table 1: Summary of truthful mechanisms for various classes of games and solution con-
cepts. Note that a “weak” mediator does not require the ability to verify player types.
A “strong” mediator does.
inputs. There is by now a very large literature on differential privacy, readers can consult
Dwork & Roth (2014) for a more thorough introduction to the field. Here we mention work
at the intersection of privacy and game theory, and defer a longer discussion of related work
in the privacy literature to Appendix H.
McSherry & Talwar (2007) were the first to observe that a differentially private algo-
rithm is also approximately dominant strategy truthful. This line of work was extended by
Nissim et al. (2012) to give mechanisms in several special cases which are exactly truthful
by combining private mechanisms with non-private mechanisms which explicitly punish non-
truthful reporting. Huang & Kannan (2012) showed that the mechanism of McSherry & Talwar
(2007) can be made exactly truthful with the addition of payments. This connection between
differential privacy and truthfulness does not carry over to joint-differential privacy, but as
we show in Section 3, it is regained if the object that we compute privately is an equilibrium
of the underlying game.
2 Model and Preliminaries
We consider games G of up to n players {1, 2, . . . , n}, indexed by i. Player i can take actions
in a set Ai, |Ai| ≤ k, where actions are indexed by j. To allow our games to be defined also
for fewer than n players, we will imagine that the null action ⊥ ∈ Ai, which corresponds to
“opting out” of the game. We define A ≡ ∏ni=1Ai. A tuple of actions, one for each player,
will be denoted a = (a1, a2, . . . an) ∈ A.
Let T be the set of player types.5 There is a utility function u : T × A → R that
5It is trivial to extend our results when agents have different typesets, Ti. T will then be
⋃
n
i=1
Ti.
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determines the payoff for a player given his type τi and a joint action profile a for all
players. When it is clear from context, we will refer to the utility function of player i,
writing ui : A → R to denote u(τi, ·). We are interested in implementing an equilibrium
of the realized complete-information game in settings of incomplete information. In the
complete-information setting, the type τi of each player is fixed and commonly known to all
players. In such settings, we can ignore the abstraction of types and consider each player
i simply to have a fixed utility function ui = u(τi, ·). In models of incomplete information,
players know their own type, but do not know the types of others.
We restrict attention to “large games,” which are “insensitive,” in the following way.
Roughly speaking a game is λ-large if a player’s choice of action affects any other player’s
payoff by at most λ. Note that we do not constrain the effect of a player’s own actions on
his payoff—a player’s action can have an arbitrary impact on his own payoff. Formally:
Definition 1 (λ-Large Game). A game is said to be λ-large if for any two distinct players
i 6= i′, any two actions ai, a′i and type τi′ for player i′ and any tuple of actions a−i,
|u(τi′, (ai, a−i))− u(τi′ , (a′i, a−i))| ≤ λ. (1)
2.1 Solution Concepts
We now define the solution concepts we will use, both in the full information setting and in the
incomplete-information setting. Denote a distribution over A by π, the marginal distribution
over the actions of player i by πi, and the marginal distribution over the (joint tuple of)
actions of every player but player i by π−i. We now present two standard solution concepts—
(approximate) pure strategy Nash equilibrium and (approximate) correlated equilibrium.
Definition 2. (Approximate Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium) Let (u1, · · · , un) be a profile
of utility functions, one for each player. The action profile a is an η-approximate pure
strategy Nash equilibrium of the (complete information) game defined by (u1, · · · , un) if for
any player i and any deviation a′i ∈ Ai, we have
ui(a) ≥ ui(a′i, a−i)− η.
Definition 3 (Approximate Correlated Equilibrium). Let (u1, · · · , un) be a profile of utility
functions, one for each player. Let π be a distribution over tuples of actions A. We say that
π is an η-approximate correlated equilibrium of the (complete information) game defined by
(u1, · · · , un) if for every player i ∈ [n], and any function fi : Ai → Ai,
E
π
[ui(a)] ≥ E
π
[ui(f(ai), a−i)]− η
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We now define a desirable solution concept in the incomplete information setting. Recall
that in this setting, we make no assumptions about how player types are generated (i.e. they
need not be drawn from a distribution). We then define a player i’s strategy si : T → Ai to
be a mapping from her type to an action.
The following definition is a very strong solution concept, that we should not expect to
exist in arbitrary games:
Definition 4 (Ex-Post Nash Equilibrium). The strategy profile s = (s1, · · · , sn) is an η-
approximate ex-post Nash equilibrium if for every type profile (τ1, . . . , τn) ∈ T n, for every
player i, and every unilateral deviation a′i ∈ Ai, we have
u(τi, s(τ)) ≥ u(τi, (a′i, s−i(τ−i)))− η
If it does exist, however, it is very robust. It is defined without knowledge of any prior
distribution on types, but if there is such a distribution, then in particular, simultaneously
for every such distribution, an ex-post Nash equilibrium is also a Bayes Nash equilibrium.
For all of these notions of η-approximate equilibrium, if η goes to 0 as the number of
players n goes to infinity (i.e. η = o(1)), then we say that we have an asymptotically exact
equilibrium.
2.2 Differential Privacy
A key tool in our paper is the design of differentially private “mediator” algorithms for
suggesting actions to play. Agents can opt out of participating in the mediator: so each
agent can submit to the mediator some type τi (which may or may not be their actual type),
or else a null symbol ⊥ which represents opting out. A mediator is then a function from a
profile of types (and ⊥ symbols) to a probability distribution over some appropriate range
Rn, i.e. M : (T ∪ {⊥})n → ∆Rn.
First we recall the definition of differential privacy, both to provide a basis for our modified
definition, and since it will be a technical building block in our algorithms. Roughly speaking,
a mechanism is differentially private if for every input profile τ = (τ1, · · · , τn) and every i,
if player i unilaterally changes his report, he has only a small effect on the distribution of
outcomes of the mechanism.
Definition 5 (Differential Privacy (Dwork, McSherry, Nissim & Smith 2006)). A mecha-
nism M satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy if for any player i, any τi, τ ′i ∈ T ∪ {⊥}, any
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tuple of types for players i′ 6= i, τ−i ∈ (T ∪ {⊥})n−1 and any event B ⊆ Rn,
P
M
[(M(τi, τ−i)) ∈ B] ≤ eε PM [(M(τ
′
i , τ−i)) ∈ B] + δ.
Differential privacy is not quite suitable for our setting because for any “reasonable”
notion of equilibrium, the action played by player i must depend in a highly sensitive way
on her own type (since she must be playing some sort of best response). To circumvent
this barrier, we define a relaxation that we call joint differential privacy. Roughly speaking,
a mechanism is jointly differentially private if for every player i, the joint distribution on
outcomes given to the n−1 players j 6= i is stable with respect to player i’s report. It differs
from differential privacy in that the outcome given to player i can depend in an arbitrary
way on player i’s own report.
Definition 6 (Joint Differential Privacy). A mechanismM satisfies (ε, δ)-joint differential
privacy if for any player i, any τi, τ
′
i ∈ T ∪ {⊥}, any tuple of utilities for players i′ 6= i, τ−i,
and any event B ⊆ Rn−1,
P
M
[
(M(τi, τ−i))−i ∈ B
] ≤ eε P
M
[
(M(τ ′i , τ−i))−i ∈ B
]
+ δ.
2.3 Congestion Games
As we suggested earlier, our results corresponding to weak mediators hold only for the class
of large congestion games. An instance of a congestion game with n players is given by a
set of m facilities E. The set of actions available to a player in the game is a subset of 2E
which depends on her type. Further, there is a loss function ℓe : R → [0, 1] for each facility
that maps the number of people using that facility to a value between zero and one.
Players wish to minimize their cost, which is the sum of the losses on the facilities that
they play on. For a set of n players with type profile τ = (τi)
n
i=1, we denote the vector of their
chosen actions by a = (ai)
n
i=1 ∈ A (recall that each action corresponds to a subset of the
facilities). For a given profile, we will denote the number of people choosing a facility e ∈ E
by ye(a), which for simplicity we will write as ye when the chosen actions are understood.
We now define the cost of a player of type τi fixing a given action profile.
c(τi, a) =
∑
e∈ai
ℓe(ye).
Note that in the previous section we referred to utilities of each player, whereas here we refer
to costs. This is merely notational— we could equivalently define the utility for a player of
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type τi for a fixed action profile a to be
u(τi, a) =
∑
e∈ai
(1− ℓe(ye)),
which has an upper bound of m.
We define the sensitivity of a loss function to quantify how much a player can impact the
loss on each facility by a unilateral deviation.
Definition 7. (Sensitivity) The sensitivity σℓ for an n-player congestion game with facilities
E and loss functions ℓ = (ℓe)e∈E is defined as
σℓ = max
e∈E;0≤ye<n
|ℓe(ye + 1)− ℓe(ye)| .
Hence, a congestion game G with sensitivity σℓ is λ-large where λ = mσℓ.
One common example of a congestion game is a “traffic routing game.”, In such a game,
the facilities E are the edges of a directed graph G = (V,E), with |E| = m. The actions in
the routing game correspond to paths in the graph, which are subsets of the edges. The type
τ of a player specifies a particular source and destination pair in the graph between which
the player wishes to route traffic, and feasible actions for a player are those subsets of edges
that form paths between the source and destination pair given by the player’s type. Recall
that A denotes the union of all action spaces: in traffic routing games, the set of all simple
paths in G.
2.4 Mediated Games
The main result of this paper is a reduction that takes an arbitrary large game G of incomplete
information and modifies it to have an ex-post Nash equilibrium implementing equilibrium
outcomes of the corresponding full-information game defined by the realized agent types.
Specifically, we modify the game by introducing the option for players to use a mediator
M that can recommend actions to the players. A mediator is defined to be an algorithm
M : (T ∪{⊥})n → A, which takes as input reported types (or ⊥ for any player who declines
to use the mediator), and outputs a suggested action to each player who opted in. We
consider two cases, depending on whether the mediator is weak or strong.
For a weak mediator M, we construct a new game GWM called the weakly mediated game
induced by the mediatorM. Informally, in GWM, players have several options. They can opt-
out of using the mediator (i.e. report ⊥) and select an action independently of it. Alternately
they can opt-in and report to it some type (not necessarily their true type), and receive a
suggested action ai. We will denote the action set to a player of type τi as A(τi) or simply
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as Ai for the ith player of type τi. Players are free to follow this suggestion or use it in some
other way. That is, they can play an action fi(ai) for some arbitrary function fi : A(τ
′
i)→ Ai
where τ ′i is the reported type of player i. Formally, the game GWM has an action set AWi for
each player i defined as:
A1i = {(τ ′i , fi) : τ ′i ∈ T , fi : A(τ ′i)→ Ai} A2i = {(⊥, fi) : fi is constant},
AWi = A
1
i ∪A2i .
We define AW =
∏n
i=1A
W
i . Mediators may be randomized, so we define the utility functions
uWM in GWM to be the expected utility that agents receive in the original game (defined by
utilities u : T × A → [0, m] in G) when players use functions fi to interpret the suggested
actions provided by the mediator. We will use the notation f(a) = (f1(a1), · · · , fn(an)).
uWM : T ×AW → R; uWM(τi, (τ ′, f)) = Ea∼M(τ ′)[u (τi, f(a))].
We also consider a stronger form of mediation, in which the mediator has the power to
verify reported agent types (equivalently, agents do not have the ability to misreport their
type to the mediator if they choose to opt in). To model such mediators, we limit the action
space of GWM so that players can either opt-out of using the mediator M (i.e. report type
⊥) or opt-in to using M, (which we denote as a report of type ⊤), which is equivalent to
her reporting her true type. Formally, given a game G defined by an action set A, a type
space T , and a utility function u, we define the strongly mediated game GSM, parameterized
by an algorithm M : {T ∪ {⊥}}n → A, as the game where player i chooses an action from
ASi defined as
(A′i)
1 = {(⊤, f)|fi : Ai → Ai} A2i = {(⊥, fi) : fi is constant}
ASi = (A
′
i)
1 ∪A2i .
We then define AS =
∏n
i=1A
S
i . Given a set of choices by the players in a strongly mediated
game GSM, we define a vector x = (xi)ni=1 such that xi = τi for each player i who chose (⊤, fi)
(each player who opted in), and xi = ⊥ for each player i who chose (⊥, ai) (each player who
opted out). The mediator then computes M(x) = a. This results in a vector of actions
a from the original game G, one for each player. For each player who opted in, they play
the action fi(ai). For each person who opted out, they play an action which was chosen
independently of the mechanisms output. The utility uSM for the strongly mediated game
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GSM is then
uSM : T × AS → R uSM(τi,x) = Ea∼M(x)[u (τi, f(a))].
3 Joint Differential Privacy and Incentives
We have now defined two augmented games parametrized by an algorithm M and in both,
players can deviate from the suggested action of the mediatorM: the weakly mediated game
GWM allows players to falsely report types to the mediator, and the strongly mediated game
GSM does not (although it allows players to opt out of using the mediator and withhold their
type). We now show that if the algorithmM satisfies certain properties then in the resulting
mediated game it is an asymptotic ex-post Nash equilibrium for every player to truthfully
report their types to the algorithmM and follow the suggested action ofM in GWM or opt-in
to using M and follow its suggestion in GSM.
Theorem 1 (Weakly Mediated Games). LetM be a mechanism satisfying (ǫ, δ)-joint differ-
ential privacy such that, when M is run on any input type profile τ , with probability at least
1 − β, M computes an η-approximate Nash equilibrium of the complete-information game
defined by τ. Then it is an η′− approximate ex-post Nash equilibrium of the weakly mediated
game GWM for each player i to play (τi, fi) where τi is i’s actual type, fi is the identity function
for each i ∈ [n], and
η′ = η + U(ǫ+ β + δ)
for an upper bound U on the utilities of every player. Informally, we will call the action
profile (τ, f) “good behavior.”
Proof. We consider the strategy profile (s1, · · · , sn) where si(τi) = (τi, fi) is the action
in GWM where player i reports τi and then faithfully follows the suggestion of M, i.e. fi is
the identity function. Consider a unilateral deviation for player i, s′i(τi) = (τ
′
i , f
′
i) where
f ′i : A(τ
′
i) → Ai is some function mapping actions feasible for reported type τ ′i to actions
feasible for her actual type τi. We seek to bound the gain that she can obtain through this
unilateral deviation:
uWM(τi, s(τ))− uWM(τi, (s′i(τi), s−i(τ−i))).
Let τ ′ be the type profile that results when player i makes this unilateral deviation i.e.
τ−i = τ ′−i. We define the best response action for a player of type τi given the action profile
of the other players to be
BRτi(a−i) = argmax
ai∈Ai
{u(τi, (ai, a−i))}.
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breaking ties arbitrarily. We first condition on the event that M outputs an η-approximate
Nash Equilibrium (which occurs with probability at least 1− β). We then know,
uWM(τi, s(τ)) = E
a∼M(τ)
[u(τi, (ai, a−i))]
≥ E
a∼M(τ)
[u(τi, (BRτi(a−i), a−i))]− η. (2)
Next, we invoke the privacy condition:
uWM(τi, s(τ)) ≥ exp(−ǫ) E
(a′i,a−i)∼M(τ ′)
[u(τi, (BRτi(a−i), a−i))]− η − Uδ
≥ E
(a′i,a−i)∼M(τ ′)
[u(τi, (BRτi(a−i), a−i))]− η − Uǫ − Uδ
≥ E
(a′i,a−i)∼M(τ ′)
[u(τi, (f
′
i(a
′
i), a−i))]− η − Uǫ− Uδ
= uWM(τi, (s
′
i, s−i(τ−i)))− η − Uǫ − Uδ.
The first inequality follows from joint differential privacy, the second from the inequality
exp(−ǫ) ≥ 1 − ǫ together with the fact that U is an upper bound on the utility function,
and the third from the definition of the best response. Combining this analysis with the
β-probability event that the mechanism fails to output an approximate Nash equilibrium
(and hence any player might be able to improve his utility by U) gives the result:
uWM(τi, s(τ)) ≥ uWM(τi, (s′i, s−i(τ−i)))− η − Uǫ− Uδ − Uβ.
Because we cannot compute Nash equilibria efficiently in general games, and because
there are settings in which we know how to privately compute correlated equilibria, but do
not know how to privately compute Nash equilibria, we would like to know what is implied
when a mediator computes a correlated equilibrium.
Theorem 2 (Strongly Mediated Games). Let M be a mechanism satisfying (ǫ, δ)-joint dif-
ferential privacy such that, on any input type profile τ, with probability at least 1 − β, M
computes an η-approximate correlated equilibrium of the complete-information game defined
by τ . Then it is an η′− approximate ex-post Nash equilibrium of the strongly mediated game
GSM for each player i to play (⊤, fi) where fi is the identity function for each i ∈ [n], and
η′ = η + U(ǫ+ δ + β)
where U is an upper bound to the utilities of every player. We will call the action profile
(⊤, f) “nice” behavior.
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Proof. We consider the strategy profile (s1, · · · , sn) where si(τi) = (⊤, fi) the action in
GSM where player i opts-in to using the mediator M and fi is the identify function. There
are two types of deviations that a player i can consider: s′i(τi) = (⊤, f ′i) for some function
f ′i : Ai → Ai not the identity function, and s′′i (τi) = (⊥, a′i) for some action a′i. First, we
consider deviations of the first kind, s′i. Conditioning on the event that M outputs an η
approximate correlated equilibrium of G (which occurs with probability at least 1− β):
uSM(τi, s(τ)) = E
a∼M(τ)
[u(τi, a)]
≥ E
a∼M(τ)
[u(τi, (f
′
i(ai), a−i)]− η
= uSM(τi, (s
′
i(τi), s−i(τ−i)))− η
where the inequality follows from the fact that M computes an η-approximate correlated
equilibrium. Now, consider a deviation of the second kind s′′i (τi) = (⊥, a′i). Again, condition
on the event that M outputs an η-approximate correlated equilibrium of G:
uSM(τi, s(τ)) = E
a∼M(τ)
[u(τi, a)]
≥ E
a∼M(τ)
[u(τi, (a
′
i, a−i))]− η
≥ exp(−ǫ) · E
a∼M(⊥,τ−i)
[u(τi, (a
′
i, a−i))]− Uδ − η
≥ E
a∼M(⊥,τ−i)
[u(τi, (a
′
i, a−i))]− Uǫ− Uδ − η
= uSM(τi, (s
′′
i (τi), s(τ)))− Uε − Uδ − η
where the first inequality follows from the η-approximate correlated equilibrium condition,
the second follows from the (ǫ, δ)-joint differential privacy condition, and the third follows
from the fact that for ǫ ≥ 0, exp(−ǫ) ≥ 1−ǫ and that utilities for G are bounded by U . Lastly,
we consider the event whereM fails to output an approximate correlated equilibrium, which
may decrease the expected utility of any player by at most Uβ (since utilities are bounded
by U , and the event in question occurs with probability at most β.). This completes the
theorem.
The main technical contributions of this paper is that we construct a weak mediator that
satisfies the hypothesis of Theorem 1 in large congestion games and we develop a strong
mediator that satisfies the hypothesis of Theorem 2 for all large games. We first state our
main result in the case of weak mediators assuming λ = O(1/n). In the general case, λ
appears in our theorem as a parameter. Note that we will use the notation O˜(g(θ)) =
O(g(θ) logr(g(θ))) where θ is a vector of parameters, g is a function of all the parameters,
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and r is some constant.
Theorem (Informal): Let G be any O(1/n)-large congestion game with m facilities and
nonnegative facility loss functions bounded by 1. Then there is a mediator M such that
“good behavior” forms an η′-approximate ex-post Nash equilibrium of the weakly mediated
game GWM, for:
η′ = O˜
(
m3/4
√
log(n)
n1/4
)
.
Moreover, when players play according to this equilibrium, the resulting play forms an η′-
approximate Nash equilibrium of the underlying complete-information game induced by the
realized player types.
Remark 3. Note that η′ = o(1) as n grows. Hence, asymptotically, good behavior forms an
exact ex-post Nash equilibrium of the weakly mediated game.
We next state our main result for arbitrary large games (again, under the assumption
that λ = O(1/n) – in general, λ will appear in the theorem as a parameter).
Theorem (Informal): Let G be any O(1/n)-large game with nonnegative utilities bounded
by 1 and action set for each player with size bounded by |Ai| ≤ k. Then there is a mediatorM
such that “nice behavior” forms an η′-approximate ex-post Nash equilibrium of the strongly
mediated game GSM, for
η′ = O˜
(√
k log(n)
n1/4
)
.
Moreover, when players play according to this equilibrium, the resulting play forms an η′-
approximate correlated equilibrium of the underlying complete-information game induced
by the realized player types.
Remark 4. Note that η′ = o(1) as n grows. Hence, asymptotically, nice behavior forms an
exact ex-post Nash equilibrium of the strongly mediated game.
The mediators that form the basis of both of these results are computationally efficient.
In the appendix, we give a computationally inefficient mediator that gives an improved
dependence on k in the general case.
4 Weak Mediators for Congestion Games
In this section, we design an algorithm that computes approximate Nash equilibria in con-
gestion games while satisfying joint differential privacy.
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Our approach is to simulate “best response dynamics,” i.e. dynamics in which each
player best responds to the actions of other players in the previous round. It is known that
in congestion games, these dynamics converge to an approximate Nash equilibrium in time
linear in n for any fixed approximation factor. In what follows, we describe this simulation
as if it was an actual process being carried out by the players. Of course, what we intend is a
centralized algorithm (the mediator) which simulates this process as part of its computation.
The main idea is that since each player’s cost in a congestion game is a function only
of how many people are playing on each facility, it is possible to implement best response
dynamics by giving each player a view only of a counter, one for each facility, which indi-
cates how many players are currently playing on that facility. To implement the algorithm
privately, we replace these exact counters with private counters, which instead maintain a
“noisy” inexact version of the player counts. In order to bound the scale of the noise that
is necessary for privacy, we need to bound how many times any single player might make a
best response over the course of the game dynamics.
This is exactly where we use the largeness condition on the game: we show that since
single moves of other players cannot significantly increase the cost of any player i in a large
game, once i has made a best response, a substantial number of other players must move
before i can substantially improve again by deviating. In combination with an upper bound
on the total number of moves that ever need to be made before convergence, this gives an
upper bound on the total number of moves made by any single player – that depends on the
largeness parameter, but not on the number of players. Finally, we show that best response
dynamics is tolerant to these low levels of error on the counters.
We go right into designing an algorithm that simulates best response dynamics via an
online counter that satisfies differential privacy. There will be a counter for each facility
indicating how many players are using that facility. The counter keeps track of a stream of
bits indicating when players arrive and leave the facility (i.e. when players make unilateral
deviations to actions that now include, or no longer include the facility). The stream of bits
on a facility e, denoted by ω≤te = (ω
j
e)
t
j=1 ∈ {−1, 0, 1}t represents the state of the facility
at times 1 through t. At each time step t, ωte = 1 if a player has unilaterally changed his
action to one that now includes facility e, ωte = −1 if a player has changed his action to one
that no longer includes facility e, or ωte = 0 if the player changing his action at time t was
either playing on facility e both before and after t, or neither before nor after t. From this
stream, we can compute the number of players using a facility e at time t, which we denote
as yte =
∑t
j=1 ω
j
e. We cannot represent this sum exactly while satisfying differential privacy:
we instead use a modified version of the binary mechanism of Chan et al. (2011) (given in
ABM in Algorithm 2) to maintain an approximate estimate of the sum of bits in this stream,
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which in turn represents at each time period the approximate number of players using the
facility. Here, we will denote a (mean 0) and scale b Laplacian random variable by Lap(b).
The original binary mechanism BM is given in the appendix.
Algorithm 1 Partial Sum Table
Input: : Stream ω≤t ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, past partial count table rˆ, and privacy parameter ǫ′.
Output: : Updated partial counts rˆ.
procedure PST(ω≤t, rˆ, ǫ′)
Write t =
∑⌊log(t)⌋
j=0 bj(t)2
j where bj(t) ∈ {0, 1}.
i← min{j : bj(t) 6= 0}
for j = 0, · · · , i do
r(j, t/2j)←∑tℓ=t/2j wℓ
rˆ(j, t/2j)← r(j, t/2j) + Lap(1/ǫ′)
return rˆ.
end procedure
We initialize a partial sum table rˆ1e to be a table of zeros of size ⌊log(nT )⌋ + 1 by nT
for each facility e ∈ E. We update as many as log(nT ) + 1 entries of past partial sum table
rˆt−1e to get rˆ
t
e = PST(ω
≤t
e , rˆ
t−1
e , ǫ
′). We then use the partial sum table rˆte to find the count
yˆte = ABM(rˆ
t
e, t) for round t.
Algorithm 2 Adaptive Binary Mechanism
Input: : Partial Sum Table rˆ and time t ≤ (length of the first row of rˆ).
Output: : A count yˆt.
procedure ABM(rˆ, t)
Write t =
∑⌊log(t)⌋
j=0 bj(t)2
j
yˆt ←∑⌊log(t)⌋j=0 bj(t)rˆ(j, t/2j)
return yˆt.
end procedure
At each “time step”, a single player has the option of making a best response move (but
will not if she has no move which substantially improves her utility). At time t with action
profile at, we compute the noisy count yˆte = yˆe(a
t) on facility e from the output of ABM. At
the same time, we denote the exact counts on the facilities as yte = ye(a
t). We define the
noisy costs for each player in terms of the counts yˆt = (yˆe(a
t))e∈E as
cˆ(τi, a
t) =
∑
e∈ai
ℓ(yˆe(a
t)).
Players will make best responses on rounds when they can substantially decrease their cost
according to the noisy cost estimates.
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Definition 8. (α-Noisy Best Response) Given an action profile at of a congestion game G,
and noisy facility counts yˆt, an α-noisy best response a∗i for player i of type τi ∈ T is
a∗i ∈ argmin
a′i∈Ai
{
cˆ(τi, (a
′
i, a
t
−i)) : cˆ(τi, a
t)− cˆ(τi, (a′i, at−i)) ≥ α
}
We now use the result of Chan et al. (2011) which gives a bound on how much the noisy
count of players on a facility yte and yˆ
t
e can differ on a stream ω
≤t
e of length t ∈ [T ] where yˆte
is computed via the binary mechanism BM.
Lemma 1. (Utility (Chan et al. 2011)) For a facility stream ω≤Te of length T , and for t ∈ [T ],
let yte =
∑t
j=1 ω
j
e, and let yˆ
t
e denote the estimated partial sum computed via the binary
mechanism yˆ≤Te = BM(ω
≤T
e , ǫ
′). Then with probability at least 1− β ′ for β ′ ∈ (2/T, 1]:
max
t∈[T ]
|yˆte − yte| ≤
√
8 log(T ) log(2/β ′)
ǫ′
.
It will be necessary to control the error, bounded in Lemma 1 for a single counter, in
the worst case over the counters on all facilities in the congestion game. We will then use
β ′ = β/m and write:
E =
√
8 log(T ) log(2m/β)
ǫ′
. (3)
We can then bound the difference ∆, with probability 1 − β, between the noisy costs and
the actual costs summed over all facilities being used by a player for a given action profile at
|cˆ(τi, at)− c(τi, at)| ≤
∑
e∈ati
∣∣ℓe(yˆe(at))− ℓe(ye(at))∣∣ .
≤ (mσℓ)E = ∆. (4)
We make the following low error assumption (which is satisfied with probability at least 1−β
by Lemma 1) so that we can bound the error from the noisy counts with high probability.
Assumption. (Low Error Assumption) For each t ∈ [T ] and each facility stream {ω≤te : e ∈
E}, we assume that the error introduced by the adaptive binary mechanism ABM is at most
E (given in (3))
We can bound the maximum number of α-noisy best responses that can be made under
noisy best response dynamics before play converges to an approximate Nash equilibrium.
This follows the classic potential function method of Monderer & Shapley (1996).
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Lemma 2. Under the low error assumption, and for α > 4∆, the total number of α-noisy best
response moves that can be made before no player has any remaining α-noisy best response
moves (i.e. play converges to an approximate equilibrium) is bounded, which allows us to set
T to be:
T =
2mn
α
. (5)
Definition 9. (Improvement) The improvement of player i of type τi at a given action
profile a is defined to be the decrease in cost he would experience by making a best response
(according to his exact cost function):
Improve(τi, a) = c(τi, a)− min
a′i∈Ai
{c(τi, (a′i, a−i))}.
Claim 1. Let at be some action profile at time t ∈ [T ]. If player i makes an α-noisy best
response at time t, then under the low error assumption:
Improve(τi, a
t) ≤ 2∆
Note that if player i of type τi does not make an α-best response at time t, then we can
bound her improvement by
Improve(τi, a
t+1) ≤ Improve(τi, at) +mσℓ.
We wish to lower bound the gap between pairs of time steps t, t′ at which any player i can
make α-noisy best responses.
Definition 10. (Noisy Gap) The noisy gap Γ of a congestion game G is:
Γ = min{|t− t′| : t 6= t′, some player i makes an α-noisy best responses at t and t′}.
Lemma 3. Assume that α > 4∆. Under the low error assumption, the noisy gap Γ of a
congestion game G satisfies
Γ ≥ α− 2∆
mσℓ
.
Furthermore, the number p of α-noisy best responses any individual player can make is
bounded by
p ≤ 4m
2nσℓ
α2
. (6)
Given the players’ input type vector τ , P-BR(τ) in Algorithm 3 simulates best response
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Algorithm 3 Private Best Responses
Input: : For a sufficiently large congestion game, users report type vector τ .
Output: : Suggested action profile a
procedure P-BR(τ)
Set: α = Θ
((
m4n(σℓ)
2 log2(mn/β)
ǫ
)1/3)
, T = 2mn
α
, p = 4m
2nσℓ
α2
, and ǫ′ = ǫ
3pm log(T )
for i ∈ [n] do
count(i)← 1
Choose ai ∈ Ai to be some arbitrary initial action.
for e ∈ E do
if e ∈ aii then wie ← 1, else wie ← 0
for e ∈ E do rˆ1e ← 0(⌊log(nT )⌋+1)×nT
for j = 2, · · · , n do rˆje ← PST(ω≤je , rˆj−1e , ǫ′)
yˆne ← ABM(rˆne , n)
an = (ai)
n
i=1
for t = n+ 1, · · · , nT do i← Player at round t
ati ← a∗i , an α-Best Response for i given the past facility count yˆt−1e
if ati == NA then a
t
i ← at−1i
for e ∈ E do ωte ← 0
else
count(i)← count(i) + 1
for e ∈ E do ωte ← 0
if e ∈ at−1i \ati then ωte ← (−1), else if e ∈ ati\at−1i then ωte ← 1.
if count(i) > p then HALT, return FAIL
for e ∈ E do rˆte ← PST(ω≤te , rˆt−1e , ǫ′), yˆte ← ABM(rˆte, t)
for j 6= i do atj ← at−1j
return anTi to player of type τi for every i ∈ [n]
end procedure
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dynamics with only access to the noisy counts of players on each facility at each iteration.
The algorithm cycles through the players in a round robin fashion and in order, each player
i makes an α-noisy best response if she has one. If not, she continues playing her current
action (we denote her noisy best response in this case as NA). After each move, the algorithm
updates the counts on each facility via ABM a modified version of the binary mechanism to
deal with adaptive streams (see Algorithm 2) and computes the updated noisy costs for the
next iteration. The algorithm terminates after it has iterated nT times (which is enough
iterations for T noisy best responses, which under the low error assumption guarantees that
we have found an equilibrium), or if any individual player has changed her action more than
p times (which we have shown can only occur if the low error assumption is violated, which
is an event with probability at most β). If the former occurs, the algorithm outputs the final
action profile, and in the latter case, the algorithm outputs that it failed.
4.1 Analysis of P-BR
The analysis of the above algorithm gives the following privacy guarantee.
Theorem 5. The algorithm P-BR(τ) is (ǫ, β)-jointly differentially private.
We give a proof sketch here to highlight the main ideas of the formal proof given in the
appendix. We observe that the action suggestion output to each player can be computed as
a function of his own type τi, and the output history of the noisy counters. This is because
each player i can compute which action he would have taken (if any) at every time step that
he is slotted to move by observing the noisy counts: his final action is simply the last noisy
best response he took over the course of the algorithm. It suffices to prove that the noisy
partial sums from which the counts are computed (internally in the binary mechanism) are
differentially private.
Chan et al. (2011) prove that a single counter facing a non-adaptively chosen (sensitivity
1) stream of bits is differentially private. We need to generalize this result to multiple
counters facing adaptively chosen streams, whose joint sensitivity (i.e. the number of times
any player ever changes his action) is bounded. This is exactly the quantity that we bounded
in Lemma 3. We want the privacy parameter to scale like the joint sensitivity of the streams,
rather than the sum of the sensitivities of each of the individual streams. This is akin to the
(standard) analysis of privately answering a vector-valued query with noise that scales with
its ℓ1 sensitivity, rather than with the sum of its coordinate-wise sensitivities.
Finally, we achieve (ǫ, β)-joint differential privacy rather than (ǫ, 0)-joint differential pri-
vacy because the publicly observable event that the algorithm fails without outputting an
equilibrium might be disclosive. However, this event occurs with probability at most β.
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This theorem satisfies the first of the two necessary hypotheses of Theorem 1. We now
show that with high probability, our algorithm outputs an approximate Nash equilibrium of
the underlying game, which satisfies the remaining hypothesis of Theorem 1. We need to
show that when P-BR(τ) outputs an action profile a, players have little incentive to deviate
from using their suggested action, leaving details to the appendix.
Theorem 6. With probability 1−β, the algorithm P-BR(τ) produces an η-approximate Nash
Equilibrium, where
η = O˜
((
m4n(σℓ)
2 log2(1/β)
ǫ
)1/3)
= O˜
((
m2nλ2 log2(1/β)
ǫ
)1/3)
(7)
We have satisfied the hypotheses of Theorem 1 (with the slight notational difference that
we are dealing with costs instead of utilities) because we have an algorithmM(τ) = P-BR(τ)
that is (ǫ, β) joint differentially private and with probability 1−β produces an action profile
that is an η approximate pure strategy Nash Equilibrium of the congestion game defined by
the type vector τ . Note that the upper bound U on utilities needed in Theorem 1 is here
U = m. In the following theorem we choose the parameter values for ǫ and β that optimize
for the approximation parameter for η′ in Theorem 1 given η in (7)
Theorem 7. Choosing P-BR(τ) as our mediator M(τ) for the congestion game G, for any
τ ∈ T n it is, with probability at least 1−o(1), an η′-approximate ex post Nash Equilibrium of
the weakly mediated game GWM for each player to play the “good” action profile (τ, f) where
η′ is
η′ = O˜
((
m5n(σℓ)
2 log2(1/σℓ)
)1/4)
= O˜
(
m3/4n1/4
√
λ log(1/λ)
)
(8)
and λ = mσℓ is the largeness parameter for G.
Note that for any value of the sensitivity that shrinks with n (treating m as constant) at
a rate of σℓ = o
(
1√
n log(n)
)
, our approximation error η asymptotes to 0 as n grows large.
5 Strong Mediators for General Games
In the previous section, we showed that there is a jointly differentially private algorithm to
compute a Nash equilibrium in a congestion game (and thus a weak mediator for congestion
games). We do not know if such an algorithm exists for arbitrary large games (If such
an algorithm does exist, it cannot be computationally efficient, since it is PPAD-hard to
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compute Nash equilibria in arbitrary games, even ignoring the privacy constraint). However,
in the following we show that we can privately compute a correlated equilibrium of arbitrary
large games, and hence can obtain a strong mediator that makes nice behavior an ex-post
Nash equilibrium, in arbitrary large games.
The high level idea of the construction is similar to the previous section, except that
we now simulate no-regret learning dynamics, rather than best response dynamics. No-
regret dynamics are guaranteed to converge to correlated equilibria in any game (see, e.g.,
Hart & Mas-Colell (2000)). As in the previous section, instead of using the actual realized
regret, we use a noisy version to ensure privacy. We show that no-regret dynamics are robust
to the addition of noise, and that since the game is large, it suffices to add “small” noise in
order to guarantee joint differential privacy.
5.1 Definitions and Basic Properties
First, we recall some basic results on no-regret learning. See Nisan (2007) for a text-book
exposition.
Let {1, 2, . . . , k} be a finite set of k actions. Let L = (l1, . . . , lT ) ∈ [0, 1]k×T be a loss ma-
trix consisting of T vectors of losses for each of the k actions. Let Π =
{
π ∈ [0, 1]k |∑kj=1 πj = 1}
be the set of distributions over the k actions and let πU be the uniform distribution. An
online learning algorithm A : Π× [0, 1]k → Π takes a distribution over k actions and a vector
of k losses, and produces a new distribution over the k actions. We use At(L) to denote the
distribution produced by running A sequentially t−1 times using the loss vectors l1, . . . , lt−1,
and then running A on the resulting distribution and the loss vector lt. That is:
A0(L) = πU ,
At(L) = A(At−1(L), lt).
We use ~A(L) = (A0(L),A1(L), . . . ,AT (L)) to be the vector of distributions when T is clear
from context.
Let π0, . . . , πT ∈ Π be a sequence of T distributions and let L be a T -row loss matrix.
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We define the quantities:
Λ(π, l) =
k∑
j=1
πjlj ,
Λ(π0, . . . , πT , L) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
Λ(πt, lt),
Λ( ~A(L), L′) = Λ(A0(L),A1(L), . . . ,AT (L), L′)
Λ( ~A, L) = Λ( ~A(L), L).
Note that the notation retains the flexibility to run the algorithm A on one loss matrix, but
measure the loss A incurs on a different loss matrix. This flexibility will be useful later.
Let F be a family of functions f : {1, 2, . . . , k} → {1, 2, . . . , k}. For a function f and a
distribution π, we define the distribution f ◦π to be
(f ◦π)j =
∑
j′:f(j′)=j
πj
′
.
The distribution f ◦π corresponds to the distribution on actions obtained by first choosing
an action according to π, then applying the function f .
Now we define the following quantities:
Λ(π1, . . . , πT , L, f) = Λ(f ◦π1, f ◦π2, . . . , f ◦πT , L),
ρ( ~A(L), L′, f) = Λ( ~A(L), L′)− Λ( ~A(L), L′, f),
ρ( ~A, L, f) = ρ( ~A(L), L, f),
ρ( ~A, L,F) = max
f∈F
ρ( ~A, L, f).
As a mnemonic, we offer the following. Λ refers to expected loss, ρ refers to regret. Next,
we define the families Ffixed,Fswap :
Ffixed = {fj(j′) = j, for all j′ | j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}}
Fswap = {f : {1, 2, . . . , k} → {1, 2, . . . , k}}
Looking ahead, we will need to be able to handle not just a priori fixed sequences of
losses, but also adaptive sequences. To see why, note that for a game setting, a player’s
loss will depend on the distribution of actions played by everyone in that period, which
will depend, in turn, on the losses everyone experienced in the previous period and how
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everyone’s algorithms reacted to that.
Definition 11 (Adapted Loss). A loss function L is said to be adapted to an algorithm A
if in each period t, the experienced losses lt ∈ [0, 1]k can be written as:
lt = L(l0,A0(l0), l1,A1(l1), . . . , lt−1,At−1(lt−1)).
The following well-known result shows the existence of algorithms that guarantee low
regret even against adapted losses (see e.g. Nisan (2007)).
Theorem 8. There exists an algorithm Afixed such that for any adapted loss L, ρ
(−−−→Afixed,L,Ffixed) ≤√
2 log k
T
. There also exists an algorithm Aswap such that ρ
(−−−→Aswap,L,Fswap) ≤ k√2 log kT .
5.2 Noise Tolerance of No-Regret Algorithms
The next lemma states that when a no-regret algorithm is run on a noisy sequence of losses,
it does not incur too much additional regret with respect to the real losses.
Lemma 4 (Regret Bounds for Bounded Noise). Let L ∈ [1
3
, 2
3
]T×k be any loss matrix, Z =
(zjt ) ∈ [−ζ, ζ ]T×k be an arbitrary matrix with bounded entries, and let L̂ = L + Z. Further,
we have an algorithm A and a family of functions F . Then
ρ( ~A(L̂), L,F) ≤ ρ( ~A, L̂,F) + 2ζ.
Corollary 1. Let L ∈ [1
3
, 2
3
]T×k be any loss matrix and let Z ∈ RT×k be a random matrix
such that PZ
[
Z ∈ [−ζ, ζ ]T×k] ≥ 1− β for some ζ ∈ [0, 1
3
], and let L̂ = L+ Z. Then
1. PZ
[
ρ
(−−−→Afixed(L̂), L,Ffixed) >√2 log kT + 2ζ] ≤ β,
2. PZ
[
ρ
(−−−→Aswap(L̂), L,Fswap) > k√2 log kT + 2ζ] ≤ β.
Note that the technical condition ζ ∈ [0, 1
3
] is needed to ensure that the noisy loss matrix
L̂ is contained in [0, 1]T×k, which is required to apply the regret bounds of Theorem 8.
Next, we state a tighter bound on the additional regret in the case where the entries of
Z are i.i.d. samples from a Laplace distribution using Theorem 15.
Lemma 5 (Regret Bounds for Laplace Noise). Let L ∈ [1
3
, 2
3
]T×k be any loss matrix. Let
Z = (zjt ) ∈ RT×k be a random matrix formed by taking each entry to be an independent
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sample from Lap(b), and let L̂ = L + Z. Let A be an algorithm. Let F be any family of
functions. Then for any α ≤ b.
P
Z
[
ρ( ~A(L̂), L,F)− ρ( ~A, L̂,F) > α
]
≤ 2|F|e−α2T/24b2 .
Corollary 2. Let L ∈ [1
3
, 2
3
]T×k be any loss matrix and let Z ∈ RT×k be a random matrix
formed by taking each entry to be an independent sample from Lap(b) for b < 1
6 log(4kT/β)
and
let L̂ = L+ Z. Then
1. PZ
[
ρ
(−−−→Afixed(L̂), L,Ffixed) >√2 log kT + b√24 log(4k/β)T ] ≤ β,
2. PZ
[
ρ
(−−−→Aswap(L̂), L,Fswap) > k√2 log kT + b√24k log(4k/β)T ] ≤ β.
As before, the technical condition upper bounding ζ is to ensure that the noisy loss
matrix L̂ is contained in [0, 1]T×k, so that the regret bounds of A apply.
5.3 From No Regret to Equilibrium
Let (τ1, . . . , τn) be the types for each of n players. Let C = {(πi,1, . . . , πi,T )}ni=1 be a collection
of n sequences of distributions over k actions, one for each player. Let {(li,1, . . . , li,T )}ni=1 be a
collection of n sequences of loss vectors li,t ∈ [0, 1]k formed by the action distribution. More
formally, for every j, lji,t = 1− Ea−i∼π−i,t [u(τi, (j, a−i))] for nonnegative utilities bounded by
1. Define the maximum regret that any player has to her losses
ρmax(C, L,F) = max
i
ρ(Ci, Li,F)
where Ci = (πi,0, . . . , πi,T ) and Li = (li,1, . . . , li,T ).
Given the collection C, we define the correlated action distribution ΠC to be the average
distribution of play. That is, ΠC is the distribution over A defined by the following sampling
procedure: Choose t uniformly at random from {1, 2, . . . , T}, then, for each player i, choose
ai randomly according to the distribution πi,t, independently of the other players.
The following well known theorem (see, e.g. Nisan (2007)) relates low-regret sequences
of play to the equilibrium concepts (Definition 3):
Theorem 9. If the maximum regret with respect to Ffixed is small, i.e. ρmax(C, L,Ffixed) ≤ η
and players utilities are nonnegative bounded by 1 then the correlated action distribution ΠC
is an η-approximate coarse correlated equilibrium. Similarly, if ρmax(C, L,Fswap) ≤ η, then
ΠC is an η-approximate correlated equilibrium.
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In this section we show that no-regret algorithms are noise-tolerant, that is we still get
good regret bounds with respect to the real losses if we run a no-regret algorithm on noisy
losses (real losses plus low-magnitude noise).
Let L ∈ [0, 1]T×k be a loss matrix. Define L = L+1
3
(entrywise) and note that L ∈
[1
3
, 2
3
]T×k. The following lemma states that running A on L doesn’t significantly increase the
regret with respect to the real losses.
Lemma 6. For every algorithm A, every family F , and every loss matrix L ∈ [0, 1]T×k,
ρ( ~A(L), L,F) ≤ 3ρ( ~A, L,F).
In particular, for every L ∈ [0, 1]T×k
ρ
(−−−→Afixed(L), L,Ffixed) ≤√18 log k
T
and ρ
(−−−→Aswap(L), L,Fswap) ≤ k√18 log k
T
.
In light of Lemma 6, for the rest of this section we will take L to be a loss matrix in
[1
3
, 2
3
]T×k. This rescaling will only incur an additional factor of 3 in the regret bounds we
prove. Let Z ∈ RT×k be a real valued noise matrix. Let L̂ = L + Z (entrywise). In the
next section we consider the case where Z is an arbitrary matrix with bounded entries. We
prove a tighter bound for the case where Z consists of independent draws from a Laplace
distribution.
Having demonstrated the noise tolerance of no-regret algorithms, we now argue that for
appropriately chosen noise, the output of the algorithm constitutes a jointly-differentially
private mechanism (Definition 6). At a high-level, our proof has two main steps. First, we
construct a wrapper NR-LAPLACEA that will ensure privacy. The wrapper takes as input the
parameters of the game, the reported tuple of types, and any no-regret algorithm A. This
wrapper will attempt to compute an equilibrium using the method outlined in Section 5.3—
for T periods, it will compute a mixed strategy for each player by running A on the previous
period’s losses. In order to ensure privacy, instead of using the true losses as input to A,
it will use losses perturbed by suitably chosen Laplace noise. After running for T periods,
the wrapper will output to each player the sequence of T mixed strategies computed for
that player. In Theorem 10 we show that this constitutes a jointly differentially private
mechanism. Then, in Theorem 11, we show that the output of this wrapper converges
to an approximate correlated equilibrium when the input algorithm is the no-swap-regret
algorithm Aswap.
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Algorithm 4 “Wrapper” Algorithm
Input: : Vector of types.
Output: : T different distributions for each player over the k actions.
procedure NR-LAPLACEA(τ1, . . . τn)
Parameters: ε, δ, λ ∈ (0, 1], n, k, T ∈ N
Let: π1,1, . . . , πn,1 each be the uniform distribution over {1, 2, . . . , k}.
Let: b = λε−1
√
8nkT log(1/δ)
for t = 1, 2, . . . , T do
Let: lji,t = 1− Eπ−i,t [u(τi, (j, a−i))] for every player i, action j.
Let: zji,t be an i.i.d. draw from Lap(b) for every player i, action j.
Let: l̂ji,t = l
j
i,t + z
j
i,t for every player i, action j.
Let: πi,t+1 = A(πi,t, l̂i,t) for every player i.
return (πi,1, . . . , πi,T ) to player i, for every i.
end procedure
5.3.1 Noisy No-Regret Algorithms are Differentially Private
Theorem 10 (Privacy of NR-LAPLACEA). For any A, the algorithm NR-LAPLACEA satisfies
(ε, δ)-joint differential privacy.
We now sketch the proof. Fix any player i and any tuple of types τ−i ∈ T n−1. We argue
that the output to all other players is differentially private as a function of τi. It will be
easier to analyze a modified mechanism that outputs the noisy losses (l̂−i,1, . . . , l̂−i,T ), rather
than the mixed strategies (π−i,1, . . . , π−i,T ). Since the noisy losses are sufficient to compute
(π−i,1, . . . , π−i,T ), proving that the noisy losses are jointly differentially private is sufficient
to prove that the mixed strategies are as well.
To get intuition for the proof, first consider the first period of noisy losses l̂−i,1. For each
player i′ 6= i, and each action j ∈ [k], the loss l1i′,j depends on πi,1, which is independent
of the utility of player i. Thus, in the first round there is no loss of privacy. In the second
round, the loss l2i′,j depends on πi,2, which depends on the losses for player i in period 1, and
thus depends on the utility of player i. The loss l2i′,j also depends on the mixed strategies
πi′′,2 for players i
′′ 6= i, i′, but as we have argued these mixed strategies are independent of
τi. We will take a pessimistic view and assume that changing player i’s type from τi to τ
′
i
will change πi,2 arbitrarily. The assumption that the underlying game is λ-large ensures that
the expected losses of player i′, l2i′,j only change by at most λ. Thus, by Theorem 14 and our
choice of the noise parameter b, each noisy loss l̂2i′,j will be ε/
√
8nkT log(1/δ) differentially
private as a function of τi.
Understanding the third round will be sufficient to argue the general case. Just as in
period 2, the loss l3i′,j depends on πi,3. However, the l
3
i′,j also depends on πi′′,3 for players
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i′′ 6= i, i′ and now these strategies do indeed depend on the utility of i (and thus τi), as we
saw when reasoning about period 2. However, the key observation is that πi′′,3 depends on
the utility of player i only through the noisy losses l2i′′,j that we computed in the previous
round. Since we already argued that these losses are differentially private as a function of τi,
it will not compromise privacy further to use these noisy losses when computing l3i′,j. Thus,
conditioned on the noisy losses output in periods 1 and 2, the losses l3i′,j depend only on the
mixed strategy of player i in period 3. As we argued before, the amount of noise we add to
these losses will be sufficient to ensure ε/
√
8nkT log(1/δ) differential privacy as a function
of τi.
In summary, we have shown that for every period t, every player i′ 6= i, and every
action j, the noisy loss l̂ti′,j is an ε/
√
8nkT log(1/δ)-differentially private function of τi and
of the previous t−1 periods’ noisy losses, which are themselves already differentially private.
In total we compute T (n − 1)k noisy losses. Hence, the adaptive composition theorem
(Theorem 16 in the appendix) ensures that the entire sequence of noisy losses l̂1−i, . . . , l̂
T
−i
is ε-differentially private as a function of τi. Since this analysis holds for every player i,
and shows that the output to all of the remaining players is (ε, δ)-differentially private as a
function of τi, the entire mechanism (with all the players input) is (ε, δ)-jointly differentially
private.
5.3.2 Noisy No-Regret Algorithms Compute Approximate Equilibria
Therefore we have shown that this “wrapper” algorithm is jointly differentially private in
the sense of Definition 6. We now state that using this algorithm with Aswap will result in
an approximate correlated equilibrium.
Theorem 11 (Computing CE). Let A = Aswap. Fix the environment, i.e. the number
of players n, the number of actions k, the largeness parameter of the game λ, and the
degree of privacy desired, (ǫ, δ). One can then select the number of rounds the algorithm
NR-LAPLACE
Aswap must run T and β satisfying:
λε−1
√
8nkT log(1/δ) ≤ 1
6 log(4nkT/β)
, (9)
such that probability at least 1 − β, the algorithm returns an η-approximate correlated equi-
librium for:
η = O˜
(
λk
√
n log(1/δ) log(1/β)
ε
)
It is already well known that no-regret alogrithms converge ‘quickly’ to approximate
equilibria– recall Theorems 8 and 9. In the previous section, we showed that adding noise
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still leads to low regret (and therefore to approximate equilibrium). The tradeoff therefore is
this: to get a more ‘exact’ equilibrium, the algorithm has to be run for more rounds but this
will result in a less private outcome by the arguments in Theorem 10. The current theorem
makes precise the tradeoff between the two.
Theorem 12. For every λ- large game G with nonnegative utilities bounded by 1 and action
sets |Ai| ≤ k, there is a mediator M such that “nice behavior” forms an η′-approximate
ex-post Nash equilibrium of the strongly mediated game GSM with probability 1− o(1) for
η′ = O˜
(
n1/4
√
kλ log(1/λ)
)
Proof. We choose ε = Θ
(√
kλ (n log(1/β) log(1/δ))1/4
)
and δ, β = λ/n. With this choice
of ε, δ, β we then choose T to satisfy (9) in the algorithm NR-LAPLACEAswap . From the previous
theorem, Theorem 11, we get that NR-LAPLACEAswap computes an η-approximate correlated
equilibrium with probability 1− β, where
η = O˜
(
n1/4
√
kλ log(1/λ)
)
.
Note that plugging in these parameter values into Theorem 2 will get the theorem statement,
where U = 1.
This is a very positive result—in several large games of interest, e.g. anonymous matching
games, λ = O(n−1). Therefore, for games of this sort η = O˜
(√
k log(n)
n1/4
)
. Therefore, if
k is fixed, but n is large, a relatively exact equilibrium of the underlying game can be
implemented, while still being jointly differentially private to the desired degree. Note that
our results remain nontrivial (treating k as fixed) for λ = o
(
1√
n log(n)
)
.
6 Discussion
In this work, we have introduced a new variant of differential privacy (joint differential
privacy), and have shown how it can be used as a tool to construct mediators which can
implement an equilibrium of full information games, even when the game is being played
in a setting of incomplete information. As a bonus, our privacy solution concept maintains
the property that no coalition of players can learn (much) about any player’s type, even in
the worst case over whatever prior information they may have had, and thus players have
almost no incentive not to participate even if they view their type as sensitive information.
Our mediators have little power in most respects (they cannot enforce actions, they cannot
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make payments or charge fees, they cannot compel participation). However, for our results
which hold for all large games, we require a strong mediator – i.e. we make the assumption
that player types are verifiable in the event that they choose to opt into the mediator. This
assumption is reasonable in many settings: for example, in financial markets, there may
be legal penalties for a firm misrepresenting relevant facts about itself, or e.g. in an organ
matching setting, the mediator may be able to verify blood types of individuals opting in.
For our results which hold in the special case of large congestion games, we are able to relax
even this assumption, and give mediators which incentivize good behavior even if agents
have the ability to misrepresent their types.
At this stage, it is important to ask what more a mediator might be able to achieve at
this level of generality. We conclude this paper by considering a few obvious directions.
6.1 Exact Versus Approximate Equilibria
A first direction concerns the fact that our mediators aim for approximate equilibria of the
resulting game, rather than exact equilibria. The reason for this is that even in large games,
it is not possible to coordinate exact equilibria while incentivizing “good behavior”. For a
simple example, consider a game with 2 players, each of whom must simultaneously choose
between two actions, evocatively called “Mountain” or “Beach.” Player 1 may be of two
types M or B. A M (respectively, B) type player gets a utility of 1 (respectively, 0) if he
goes to the mountain, and 0 (respectively , 1) he goes to the beach, less a disutility of ǫ if
player 2 takes the same action. Player 2 has no private type, and gets 0 utility from either
action, plus a bonus of ǫ if he matches player 1’s action. It is easy to verify that the unique
exact Nash equilibrium (and correlated equilibrium) of the two full-information games is for
player 1 to take his preferred action, and for player 2 to match him. It is equally easy to
verify that a weak mediator cannot achieve exact Nash equilibrium in this setting, despite
the game satisfying our assumptions—player 1 has an incentive to misreport his type, and
send player 2 to the other location. A simple variant of this game (with 2n player 1’s and a
single player 2) verifies the same point for a strong mediator at a profile where there are an
equal number of both types.
6.2 Improving Bounds
Even if exact equilibria are beyond reach, one may wonder whether more exact equilibria
(or alternately, ones which have a lower approximation error than ours) are achievable. We
provide suggestive evidence that this is not possible.
Specifically, we show that there is no algorithm that privately computes an η-approximate
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equilibrium of an arbitrary n-player 2-action game, for η ≪ 1/√n logn. In other words, there
cannot exist an algorithm that privately computes a “significantly” more exact equilibrium
without assuming further structure on the game. Thus, the construction of a more exact
mediator that provides incentives will therefore have to use different techniques entirely than
those in our paper.
Our proof is by a reduction to the problem of differentially private subset-sum query re-
lease, for which strong information theoretic lower bounds are known (Dinur & Nissim 2003,
Dwork & Yekhanin 2008). The problem is as follows: Consider a database d = (d1, . . . , dn) ∈
{0, 1}n. A subset-sum query q ⊆ [n] is defined by a subset of the n database entries and
asks “What fraction of the entries in d are contained in q and are set to 1?” Formally, we
define the query q as q(d) = 1
n
∑
i∈q di. Given a set of subset-sum queries Q =
{
q1, . . . , q|Q|
}
,
we say that an algorithm M(d) releases Q to accuracy η if M(d) = (a1, . . . , a|Q|) such that
|aj − qj(d)| ≤ η for every j ∈ [|Q|].
We show that an algorithm for computing approximate equilibrium in arbitrary games
could also be used to release arbitrary sets of subset-sum queries accurately. The following
theorem shows that a differentially private mechanism to compute an approximate equilib-
rium implies a differentially private algorithm to compute subset-sums.
Theorem 13. For any η > 0, if there is an (ε, δ)-jointly differentially private mechanism
M that computes an η-approximate coarse correlated equilibria in (n + |Q| logn)-player, 2-
action, 1/n-sensitive games, then there is an (ε, δ)-differentially private mechanism M′ that
releases 36η-approximate answers to any |Q| subset-sum queries on a database of size n.
Applying the results of Dwork & Yekhanin (2008), a lower bound on equilibrium com-
putation follows easily.
Corollary 3. Any (ε = O(1), δ = o(1))-differentially private mechanism M that com-
putes an η-approximate coarse correlated equilibria in n-player 2-action games with O(1/n)-
sensitive utility functions must satisfy η = Ω(1/
√
n log n).
6.3 Welfare
The fact that a mediator achieves some equilibrium of the underlying full-information game
may be viewed as unsatisfactory. Can a mediator do more, e.g. achieve high (utilitarian)
welfare equilibria of the underlying game? The answer is mixed. For general games, the
answer is negative. In a recent paper, Barman & Ligett (2015) show that it is computation-
ally hard to compute an approximate correlated equilibrium of a game while offering any
non-trivial welfare guarantee. In other words, any tractable algorithm which computes a
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correlated equilibrium of a general game cannot offer non-trival welfare guarantees (unless
P = NP).
Within specific classes of games, however, our mediators achieve high welfare. For ex-
ample, Roughgarden (2009) shows that for the class of smooth games, any approximate
correlated equilibrium achieves welfare that is a significant fraction of the optimal welfare of
any (possibly non-equilibrium) action profile. For such games, of course, our mediators also
achieve this welfare guarantee.
6.4 Strong vs. Weak Mediators
Next, one may wonder whether there need be any distinction between “strong” and “weak”
mediators, which differ in their ability to verify reported player types. Mechanically, we
derive weak mediators by giving algorithms which privately compute Nash equilibria, and
strong mediators by giving algorithms which privately compute correlated equilibria. Is the
difference merely a failure in our analysis, i.e., might an algorithm that privately computes
a correlated equilibrium actually yield a weak mediator?
The answer is no. The intuitive reason is that because joint differential privacy does not
constrain the relationship between an agent’s report and the suggested action he is given. If
the mediator is merely guaranteed to be computing a correlated equilibrium, it can be that
by misreporting his type, an agent can obtain a suggestion that is more informative about
his opponent’s actions, which may allow for profitable “double deviations” (misreport type
and then not follow suggested action). On the other hand, if the mediator is computing a
Nash equilibrium, an agent’s reported type contains no information about his opponent’s
randomness, which avoids this problem and yields a weak mediator.
Consider the following simple example of a two player game with two actions – Beach (B)
and Mountain (M). Player 1 has a fixed type and his utility function is a constant function,
independent of the action that either he or his opponent plays. Player 2, in contrast, may
be of one of two types: Social (S) or antisocial (A). Independently of type, player 2 gets a
payoff of 1
2
by playing B over M . However, if player 2 is of the social type, then he obtains
additional payoff of 1 if and only if he chooses the same action that his opponent plays.
Conversely, if player 2 is of the antisocial type, then he obtains additional payoff of 1 if and
only if he chooses the opposite action of his opponent.
Now consider the following mediator: independently of player 2’s report, the mediator
suggests to player 1 that he randomize uniformly between B and M . If player 2 reports
type S, then the mediator suggests to player 2 that he play action B. If player 2 reports
type A, then the mediator always suggests to player 2 that he play the opposite action of
player 1. Note several things about this mediator: first, it satisfies perfect joint differential
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privacy, because player 1’s suggestion is completely independent of player 2’s report. Second,
it always suggests an (exact) correlated equilibrium of the game induced by the reported
types. Finally, if player 2 is of type S, he has substantial incentive to deviate from “good
behavior”: he can misreport his type to be A, and then always perform the action that the
mediator does not suggest to him. This results in an expected utility of 5/4, compared to
an expected utility of 1 if he behaves truthfully. Making the game large does not change the
result: a game with a large, odd number of player 1’s, and a single player 2 who wants to
match/ mismatch the majority, would result in the same result.
The above example demonstrates that it is not sufficient for a weak mediator to privately
compute a correlated equilibrium, although this is sufficient to implement a strong mediator.
We have shown that strong mediators exist in all large games, and that weak mediators exist
in all congestion games (and therefore, implicitly, in all potential games that can be concisely
represented as potential games). It remains open whether weak mediators exist in all large
games.
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A Privacy Preliminaries
We will state some useful tools for achieving differential privacy. We first cover the Laplace
Mechanism (Dwork, McSherry, Nissim & Smith 2006).
Definition 12 (Laplace Random Variable). A continuous random variable Z has a Lapla-
cian distribution with parameter b > 0 if its probability density p(z) for Z = z is the following:
p(z) =
1
2b
exp (−|z|/b) .
We next define the most any single player can influence the output of a function f that
takes a database and outputs some vector of real values.
Definition 13 (Sensitivity). The sensitivity of a function f : Dn → Rk is defined as
S(f) = max
i∈[n],di 6=d′i∈D
d−i∈Dn−1
{||f(di, d−i)− f(d′i, d−i)||1}
If we want to evaluate f on some database and f has large sensitivity, then to make the
output of f look the same after a person changes her data, we would need to add a lot of
noise to f . We are now ready to present the Laplacian Mechanism ML, given in Algorithm
5.
Algorithm 5 Laplacian Mechanism
Input: : Database d ∈ Dn, query f : Dn → Rk, and privacy parameter ǫ.
procedure ML(d, f, ǫ)
{Zi} i.i.d.∼ Laplace
(
S(f)
ǫ
)
i = 1, · · · , k.
Z ← (Z1, · · · , Zk)
fˆ(d)← f(d) + Z
return fˆ(d).
end procedure
Theorem 14. The Laplacian Mechanism ML is ǫ-differentially private.
The following concentration inequality for Laplacian random variables will be useful.
Theorem 15 ((Gupta et al. 2012)). Suppose {Yi}Ti=1 are i.i.d. Lap(b) random variables, and
scalars qi ∈ [0, 1]. Define Y := 1T
∑
i qiYi. Then for any α ≤ b,
Pr[Y ≥ α] ≤ exp
(
−α
2T
6b2
)
.
An important result we will use is that differentially private mechanisms ‘compose’ nicely.
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Theorem 16 (Adaptive Composition (Dwork et al. 2010)). Let A : U → RT be a T -fold
adaptive composition6 of (ε, δ)-differentially private mechanisms. Then A satisfies (ε′, T δ +
δ′)-differential privacy for
ε′ = ε
√
2T ln(1/δ′) + Tε(eε − 1).
In particular, for any ε ≤ 1, if A is a T -fold adaptive composition of
(
ε/
√
8T ln(1/δ), 0
)
-
differentially privacy mechanisms, then A satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy.
B Binary Mechanism
Algorithm 6 Binary Mechanism (Chan et al. 2011)
Input: : ω≤T ∈ {−1, 0, 1}T , privacy parameter ǫ > 0
Output: : Count with Laplacian noise yˆT
procedure BM(ω≤T , ǫ′)
initialize: r is a table of zeros of size ⌊log(T )⌋+ 1 by T .
for t = 1, · · · , T do
Write t =
∑⌊log(t)⌋
j=0 bj(t)2
j
i← min{j : bj(t) 6= 0}
for j = 0, · · · , i do
r(j, t/2j)←∑tℓ=t/2j ωℓ
rˆ(j, t/2j)← r(j, t/2j)+ Lap(1/ǫ)
yˆt ←∑⌊log(t)⌋j=0 bj(t)rˆ(j, t/2j)
return yˆ≤T
end procedure
Note that we have modified the original presentation of the binary mechanism from
(Chan et al. 2011) but it has the exact same behavior; we are not concerned with space so
we keep a table of entries rather than a vector of entries that continually get overwritten as
zero to compute the counts yˆt for each t ∈ [T ] in BM. As presented here, BM(ω≤T , ǫ) would
be (log(T ) + 1)ǫ- differentially private. The output of BM is a vector of counts yˆ≤T , whereas
ABM produces a single count for a particular t ∈ [T ]. If we start with rˆ1 as a table of zeros,
and we define for t = 2, · · · , T
rˆt = PST(ω≤t, rˆt−1, ǫ) yˆt = ABM(rˆt, t)
then given ω≤T the vector yˆ≤T has the same distribution over outcomes as BM(ω≤T , ǫ).
6See (Dwork et al. 2010) for further discussion
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C Omitted Proofs from Weak Mediators Section
C.1 Designing a Weak Mediator
Proof of Lemma 2. At round t ∈ [T ], player i is making an α-noisy best response to get the
updated action profile at+1, which means that her actual cost may only be decreasing by as
little as α− 2∆.
c(τi, a
t+1) ≥ cˆ(τi, at+1)−∆ ≥ cˆ(τi, at) + α−∆
≥ c(τi, at) + α− 2∆
We use the potential function Φ(y(a)) =
∑
e∈E
∑ye(a)
i=1 ℓe(i) to then bound the number of
possible α-noisy best responses made by all the players. Note that the difference in potential
when a player changes an action is the same as the cost difference that same player that
moved experiences, i.e. Φ(y(at+1))− Φ(y(at)) = c(τi, at+1)− c(τi, at).
T ≤ mn
a− 2∆ < 2
mn
α
.
Proof of Claim 1. When a player makes an α- best response at time t with respect to the
noisy counts on each facility, then we can bound the amount he could improve by
Improve(τi, a
t) = c(τi, a
t)− min
a′i∈Ri
{c(τi, (a′i, at−i))} = c(τi, at)− {c(τi, (a∗i , at−i)),
≤ cˆ(τi, at) +∆− (cˆ(τi, (a∗i , at−i))−∆),
≤ 0 + 2∆.
Proof of Lemma 3. Let t and t + t′ be two times that player i of type τi made α-noisy best
responses. We have
α ≤ Improve(τi, at+t′) ≤ 2∆+ (t′)mσℓ.
We set t′ = α−2∆
mσℓ
. Further, we know from (5) that under the low error assumption, there
can be as many as 2mn
α
total α-noisy best responses. With our bound on the noisy gap we
obtain a bound on the number of α-noisy best response moves p a single player can make is
p ≤
2mn
α
Γ
≤ 2m
2nσℓ
α(α− 2∆) ,
and for α > 4∆ we obtain the stated result for p.
C.2 Analysis of P-BR
We first state a few general lemmas which we use to prove P-BR(τ) is jointly-differentially
private.
Lemma 7 (Post-Processing (Dwork, McSherry, Nissim & Smith 2006)). Given a mechanism
M : T n → O and some function φ : O → O′ that is independent of the players’ types
τ ∈ T n, if M(τ) is (ǫ, δ)- differentially private then φ(M(τ)) is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private.
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Lemma 8 (Billboard Lemma). Let M : T n → On be an (ǫ, δ) differentially private mecha-
nism and consider any function θ : T ×On → An. Define the mechanism M′ : T n → An as
follows: on input τ , M′ computes o =M(τ), and then M′(τ) outputs to each i:
M′(τ)i = θ(τi, o).
M′ is then (ǫ, δ)-jointly differentially private.
Proof. We fix a player i ∈ [n] and let B−i ⊆ An−1.
P
a−i∼M ′(τ)
[a−i ∈ B−i] = P
o∼M(τ)
[(θ(τj , o))j 6=i ∈ B−i].
We define φj(o) = θ(τj , o) and then
φ(o) = (φj(o))j 6=i.
Note that φ is independent of τi. We can now invoke Lemma 7.
P
o∼M(τ)
[(θ(τj , o))j 6=i ∈ B−i] = P
o∈M(τ)
[φ(o) ∈ B−i],
≤ exp(ǫ) P
o∈M(τ ′i ,τ−i)
[φ(o) ∈ B−i] + δ,
= exp(ǫ) P
a−i∼M ′(τ ′i ,τ−i)−i
[a−i ∈ B−i] + δ.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 5,that P-BR(τ) is indeed jointly differentially private.
Proof of Theorem 5. To achieve joint differential privacy, we want to apply Lemma 8. We
first argue that if we were to output the entire transcript of partial counts on every facility
after every player has moved, then this is differentially private in the reported types of the
players. We will denote the mechanism M as
M : T n → R(⌊log(nT )⌋+1)·nT ·m, M (τ) = (qˆ≤nTe )e∈E,
where the output ofM is the vector form of the final table rˆnT = (rˆnTe )e∈E computed in P-BR
that uses PST and ABM. Each qˆte is the vector of entries that were updated in the table rˆ
t
e
from rˆt−1e . For ease of notation, we will write values without subscripts to be the vector of
values for every subscript, e.g. qˆ≤t = (qˆ≤te )e∈E.
There are three random vectors W t, Qt and Qˆt that we need to account for at each
iteration t of P-BR. Initially, there is a vector stream ω≤n ∈ {−1, 0, 1}m×n which is deter-
ministically chosen as a function of what each of the n players report. We then set W t = ωt
for t ≤ n.
With each stream ω≤t we then use the routine PST, which calculates the table of exact
partial counts rt = (rte)e∈E, where r
t
e ∈ R(⌊log(nT )⌋+1)×nT and then outputs the table of
approximate partial counts rˆt. We will use the function gte : {−1, 0, 1}t → Ni(t) to denote the
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vector of exact partial counts that get updated at time t in PST where
i(t) = min
j : bj(t) 6= 0 with t =
⌊log(t)⌋∑
ℓ=0
bℓ(t)2
ℓ
 .
That is,
gte
(
ω≤te
)
=
(
rte(j, t/2
j)
)i(t)
j=0
=
 t∑
ℓ=t/2j
ωℓe
i(t)
j=0
, and gt(ω) = (gte(ωe))e∈E.
We then define the variable
Qt = gt(W≤t), (10)
which up to round n is deterministic. We introduce the noise vector Zt of size m · i(t) with
each entry being an i.i.d. Laplace random variable with parameter 1/ǫ′.
Qˆt = Qt + Zt. (11)
We note that there is a one to one mapping φ that takes any output of PST(ω≤te , rˆ
t−1
e ) = rˆ
t
e
that does not include any of the zero entries that have not been updated from r1e and r
t
e, to
a realization of Qˆ≤t = qˆ≤t; the quantity qˆ≤te is just the table rˆ
t
e represented as a vector so
that φ(rˆte) = qˆ
≤t
e . It will be more convenient in this proof to focus on the vector qˆ
≤t, rather
than the table rˆt.
We are left with defining W t for t > n. In P-BR, each bit ωte for t > n depends on which
player is moving at time t and the table of approximate partial counts, rˆt−1, from which
we can count the number of people yˆt−1e on facility e at that time. We denote the player
that moves at time t when they reported type τ as τ(t). The bit ωte is then determined by
player τ(t)’s best response move given the table rˆt−1 (or equivalently qˆ≤t−1). We denote this
dependence as a function f t(qˆ≤t−1; τ(t)). We then define the random variable W t as
W t = f t
(
Qˆ≤t−1; τ(t)
)
for t > n. (12)
We then have that M(τ) and Qˆ≤nT have the same distribution.
When proving differential privacy, we set the outcome and see how much the probability
distributions differ when we change a single entry in our database. If we change the reported
types τ to (τ ′i , τ−i), then the random variable W
t changes to (W ′)t, Qt changes to (Q′)t, and
Qˆt changes to (Qˆ′)t but we fix the outcome realization qˆ≤nT in both cases.
Regardless of whether player i reports τi or τ
′
i , we know that he can move at most p
different times. We let {t1, · · · , tp} be the times when i moves when reporting τi given
realization qˆ≤nT and {t′1, · · · , t′p} be the times when i moves having reported τ ′i instead. We
then relabel the times and reorder them so that t1 < t2 < · · · , t2p are the times when i moves
having reported τi or τ
′
i . We denote T
p = {t1, · · · , t2p}. We consider bounding the following
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quantity
P
[
Qˆ≤nT = qˆ≤nT
]
=
nT∏
t=1
P
[
Qˆt = qˆt
∣∣qˆ<t] .
From (12) we know W t = (W ′)t when we condition on qˆ<t and t /∈ T p. We then consider
rounds t ∈ T p, while conditioning on qˆ<t. We know that each realization of W te − (W ′)te ∈
{−1, 0, 1} for each e ∈ E. Thus, W≤nT will differ by one in as many as 2pm entries from
(W ′)≤nT when we condition on qˆ<t for each entry t ≤ nT . Hence, Q≤nT has total ℓ1 distance
2pm (log(nT ) + 1) ≤ 3pm log(nT ) from (Q′)≤nT when we again condition on qˆ<t for each
round. We then add independent Laplacian noise with parameter 1/ǫ′ to each component
to get
P
[
Qˆ≤nT = qˆ≤nT
]
=
nT∏
t=1
P
[
Zt = qˆt −Qt ∣∣qˆ<t ] ,
≤ exp(3ǫ′pm log(nT )) ·
nT∏
t=1
P
[
Zt = qˆt − (Q′)t ∣∣qˆ<t ] ,
= exp(3ǫ′pm log(nT )) · P
[
(Qˆ′)≤nT = qˆ≤nT
]
= exp(ǫ)P
[
(Qˆ′)≤nT = qˆ≤nT
]
.
We have thus shown that M is ǫ-differentially private.
From the partial sum tables that M outputs and the extra bit of information to each
player j being which initial action P-BR had j taking, each player can determine what actions
the algorithm had her moving to at each round that she moved and hence the last action she
was taking when the algorithm terminated. We then use Lemma 8 to conclude that we have
an ǫ-joint differentially private mechanism. Lastly, we get (ǫ, β) joint differential privacy
(instead of (ǫ, 0) joint differential privacy) because there is a small probability β that P-BR
may not produce an output, which may be disclosive.
We now prove the remaining theorems from this section.
Proof of Theorem 6. We first assume that the low error assumption holds. Recall that in
this case, no player ever makes more than p action changes, and so the algorithm outputs
an action profile and does not fail. We consider the difference in cost to player i when she
deviates from her suggested action ai to a best response action a
∗
i given the other players’
actions a−i. Recall that ∆ is the upper bound on the error between the noisy costs for each
player and their true cost. We showed in Lemma 2 that given α > 4∆ the total number of
possible α-noisy best response moves in a routing game is T . P-BR(τ) iterates through each
of the n players T times (for a total of nT time steps) which is enough to elicit T α-noisy
best responses. Under the low error assumption therefore, at completion with action profile
a, no player can have an α-noisy best response. We have,
η = max
i∈[n]
{Improve(τi, a)} = max
i∈[n]
{c(τi, a)− c(τi, (a∗i , a−i))} ≤ α + 2∆.
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We now expand ∆ from (4) by substituting in the privacy parameter ǫ′ that was given in
Algorithm 3. We have bounds for the number of total approximate best response moves T
given in (5) and the total number of times p any single player can change actions, found in
(6), which are used in P-BR(τ):
η ≤ α+ 2∆ = α +O
(
m4n(σℓ)
2 log
3/2 (mn/α)
√
log(m/β)
α2ǫ
)
.
If we set
α = Θ
((
m4n(σℓ)
2 log2(mn/β)
ǫ
)1/3)
,
we can balance the two terms in the bound of η to get the desired result. We still need to
check the condition α > 4∆. This requires
α3 > 48
√
8
m4n(σℓ)
2 log2(2mn/(αβ))
ǫ
.
This is precisely the ordering for α we found to obtain the best bound for η. To complete
the proof, we note that the low error assumption holds with probability at least 1− β.
Proof of Theorem 7. We have satisfied the hypotheses of Theorem 1 (with the slight dif-
ference that we are dealing with costs instead of utilities) because we have an algorithm
M(τ) = P-BR(τ) that is (ǫ, β) joint differentially private and with probability 1−β produces
an action profile that is an η approximate pure strategy Nash Equilibrium of the routing
game defined by the type vector τ . Thus for any τ ∈ T n, the “good” behavior profile (τ, f)
is an η′-approximate Nash Equilibrium of the complete information game GM, where
η′ ≤η +mǫ+mβ +mβ = O
((
m4n(σℓ)
2 log2(mn/β)
ǫ
)1/3)
+mǫ+ 2mβ.
We can now optimize the bound for η′ by adjusting ǫ. We set
ǫ = Θ
((
mn(σℓ)
2 log2(mn/β)
)1/4)
. (13)
We then need to scale β in an optimal way recalling that the bound in the difference in
the exact and approximate counts in Lemma 1 requires β > 2m/(nT ) (note that the stream
is length nT instead of T ). We set β =
√
σℓ/n for n sufficiently large. This gives our bound
for η′.
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D Proofs of Noise Tolerance of No Regret Algorithms (Sec-
tion 5.2)
Proof of Lemma 4. Let (π0, . . . , πT ) be any sequence of distributions and f : {1, 2, . . . , k} →
{1, 2, . . . , k} be any function. Then:
ρ(π0, . . . , πT , L, f)− ρ(π0, . . . , πT , L̂, f)
= (Λ(π0, . . . , πT , L)− Λ(f ◦π0, . . . , f ◦πT , L))− (Λ(π0, . . . , πT , L̂)− Λ(f ◦π0, . . . , f ◦πT , L̂)).
= (Λ(π0, . . . , πT , L)− Λ(π0, . . . , πT , L̂)) + (Λ(f ◦π0, . . . , f ◦πT , L̂)− Λ(f ◦π0, . . . , f ◦πT , L̂))
=
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
k∑
j=1
πjt (l
j
t − l̂jt )
)
+
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
k∑
j=1
(f ◦πt)j(ljt − l̂jt )
)
(by definition of Λ)
=
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
k∑
j=1
πjt z
j
t
)
+
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
k∑
j=1
(f ◦πt)jzjt
)
(by definition of z) (14)
≤ ζ
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
k∑
j=1
πjt
)
+ ζ
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
k∑
j=1
(f ◦πt)j
)
(∀j, t |zjt | ≤ ζ)
= 2ζ,
where the final equality follows from the fact that πt, f◦πt are probability distributions.
Proof of Corollary 1. We will prove only item 1, the proof for 2 is analogous. First, by the
assumption of the theorem, we will have L̂ ∈ [0, 1]T×k except with probability at most β.
Therefore, by Theorem 8,
P
Z
[
ρ
(−−−→Afixed, L̂,Ffixed) >√2 log k
T
]
≤ β
Further, by Lemma 4, we know that L̂ ∈ [0, 1]T×k implies
ρ
(−−−→Afixed(L̂), L,F) ≤ ρ(−−−→Afixed, L̂,F)+ 2ζ.
Combining, we have the desired result, i.e.
P
Z
[
ρ
(−−−→Afixed(L̂), L,Ffixed) >√2 log k
T
+ 2ζ
]
≤ β.
Proof of Lemma 5. Let (π0, . . . , πT ) be a sequence of distributions and f : {1, 2, . . . , k} →
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{1, 2, . . . , k} be any function. Recall by (14),
ρ(π0, . . . , πT , L, f)− ρ(π0, . . . , πT , L̂, f) =
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
k∑
j=1
πjt z
j
t
)
+
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
k∑
j=1
(f ◦πt)jzjt
)
.
(15)
We wish to place a high probability bound on the quantities:
Yπ0,...,πT =
1
T
T∑
t=1
k∑
j=1
πjt z
j
t .
Changing the order of summation,
Yπ0,...,πT =
∑
a1,...,aT∈A
(
T∏
t=1
πatt
)(
1
T
T∑
t=1
zatt
)
,
the equality follows by considering the following two ways of sampling elements zjt . The first
expression represents the expected value of zjt if t is chosen uniformly from {1, 2, . . . , T} and
then j is chosen according to πt. The second expression represents the expected value of z
j
t
if (a1, . . . , aT ) are chosen independently from the product distribution π1×π2×· · ·×πT and
then at is chosen uniformly from (a1, . . . , aT ). These two sampling procedures induce the
same distribution, and thus have the same expectation. Thus we can write:
P
Z
[Yπ0,...,πT > α] ≤ max
a1,...,aT∈A
P
Z
[
1
T
T∑
t=1
zatt > α
]
≤ P
Z
[
1
T
T∑
t=1
z1t > α
]
.
where the second inequality follows from the fact that the variables zjt are identically dis-
tributed. Applying Theorem 15, we have that for any α < ζ ,
P
Z
[Yπ0,...,πT > α] ≤ e−α
2T/6b2 . (16)
Let (π0, . . . , πT ) = A(L̂). By Equation (15) we have
P
Z
[
ρ(A(L̂), L, f)− ρ(A(L̂), L̂, f) > α
]
≤ P
Z
[
1
T
T∑
t=1
k∑
j=1
πjt z
j
t > α/2
]
+ P
Z
[
1
T
T∑
t=1
k∑
j=1
(f ◦πt)jzjt > α/2
]
≤ 2e−α2T/24b2
where the last inequality follows from applying (16) to the pair of sequences (π0, . . . , πT ) and
(f ◦π0, . . . , f ◦πT ). The Lemma now follows by taking a union bound over F .
Proof of Corollary 2. First, we demonstrate that L̂ ∈ [0, 1]T×k except with probability at
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most β, which will be necessary to apply the regret bounds of Theorem 8. Specifically:
P
Z
[
∃zjt s.t. |zjt | >
1
3
]
≤ Tk P
Z
[
|z11 | >
1
3
]
≤ 2Tke−1/6b ≤ β/2, (17)
where the first inequality follows from the union bound, the second from the definition of
Laplacian r.v.’s and the last inequality follows from the assumption that b ≤ 1/6 log(4Tk/β).
The theorem now follows by conditoning on the event L̂ ∈ [0, 1]T×k and combining the
regret bounds of Theorem 8 with the guarantees of Lemma 5. For parsimony, we will only
demonstate the first inequality, the second is analogous. Recall again by Theorem 8, we have
that whenever L̂ ∈ [0, 1]T×k:
ρ(
−−−→Afixed, L̂,Ffixed) ≤
√
2 log k
T
.
Further, by Lemma 5, we know that:
P
Z
[
ρ
(−−−→Afixed(L̂), L,Ffixed)− ρ(−−−→Afixed, L̂,Ffixed) > α] ≤ 2|Ffixed|e−α2T/24b2
= 2ke−α
2T/24b2 .
Substituting α = b
√
24 log(4k/β)
T
, we get:
P
Z
[
ρ
(−−−→Afixed(L̂), L,Ffixed)− ρ(−−−→Afixed, L̂,Ffixed) > α] ≤ β/2. (18)
The result follows by combining (17) and (18).
Proof of Lemma 6. Let π0, . . . , πT ∈ Πk be any sequence of distributions and let f : {1, 2, . . . , k} →
{1, 2, . . . , k} be any function. Then
ρ(π0, . . . , πT , L, f) = Λ(π0, . . . , πT , L)− Λ(f ◦π0, . . . , f ◦πT , L)
= 3
(
Λ(π0, . . . , πT , L)− Λ(f ◦π0, . . . , f ◦πT , L)
)
= 3
(
ρ(π0, . . . , πT , L, f)
)
.
The second equality follows from the definition of Λ and from linearity of expectation. The
Lemma now follows by setting (π0, . . . , πT ) = ~A(L), taking a maximum over f ∈ F , and
plugging in the guarantees of Theorem 8.
E Proofs for Computing Equilibria in Games with Few Actions
(Section 5.3.1)
Proof of Theorem 10. Fix any player i, any pair of types for i, τi, τ
′
i , and a tuple of types
τ−i for everyone else. To show differential privacy, we need to analyze the change in the
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distribution of the joint output for all players other than i, (π−i,1, . . . , π−i,T ) when the input
is (τi, τ−i) as opposed to (τ ′i , τ−i).
It will be easier to analyze the privacy of a modified mechanism that outputs (l̂−i,1, . . . , l̂−i,T ).
Observe that this output is sufficient to compute (π−i,1, . . . , π−i,T ) just by running A. Thus,
if we can show the modified output satisfies differential privacy, then the same must be true
for the mechanism as written.
Let us define πj,1 to be the uniform distribution over the k actions for player j ∈ [n],
which is independent in the input types of all the players. We then define laj,1 as the loss for
player j ∈ [n] for action a ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} at round 1 for input type (τi, τ−i) and similarly l′aj,1
for input type (τ ′i ., τ−i). Note that l
a
j,1 = l
′a
j,1 for all j 6= i and a ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}.
We then define the random variables Lˆaj,1 = l
a
j,1+Z
a
j,t and Lˆ
′a
j,1 = l
′a
j,1+Z
a
j,1where Z
a
j,1 is a
Laplace random variable with parameter b. We are then outputting a realization (lˆa−i,1)a∈[k]
that we hold fixed no matter if the input type is (τi, τ−i) or (τ ′i , τ−i). Note that Lˆ
a
j,1 and Lˆ
′a
j,1
have the same distribution for j 6= i.
We then compute the distribution over actions for the next iteration πj,2 = A(πj,1, lˆj,1),
for all j 6= i. Note that because we are not fixing the output for the i’th player, we have
πi,2 6= π′i,2 and can change arbitrarily. We then ask how much this can effect the other j 6= i
players’ losses at round 2
laj,2 = 1− E
a−j∼π−j,2
[u(τj, (a, a−j))] = 1− E
a
−(i,j)∼π−(i,j),t
[
E
ai∼πi,t
[
u(τj, (a, ai, a−(i,j)))
]]
≤ 1− E
a(−i,j)∼π−(i,j),t
[
E
ai∼πi,t
[
u(τj, (a, ai, a−(i,j))) + λ
]]
= l′aj,2 + λ,
where the inequality comes from the fact that we assumed our game is λ-large (Definition
1), and by linearity of expectation. A similar argument shows for j 6= i:
laj,2 ≥ l′aj,2 − λ.
We then add noise to get Lˆaj,2 = l
a
j,2 + Z
a
j,2 and Lˆ
′a
j,2 = l
′a
j,2 + Z
a
j,2 where the sensitivity
between laj,2 and l
′a
j,2 is λ for j 6= i and again Zaj,2 are Laplace random variables with parameter
b. We are then fixing the realizations of Lˆaj,2 and Lˆ
′a
j,2 to be lˆ
a
j,2 for j 6= i. Once again, the
distributions πj,3 = A(πj,2, lˆj,2) do not change for j 6= i between the two input types, but πi,3
and π′i,3 can change arbitrarily.
Continuing via induction on the rounds t, we see that fixing the output (lˆa−i,t)a∈[k] between
the input types, allows for the losses laj,t+1 and l
′a
j,t+1 to differ by as much as λ between the two
input types. The noisy losses l̂−i,1, . . . , l̂−i,t have already been computed when the mechanism
reaches round t+ 1, thus the mechanism fits the definition of adaptive composition.
Thus, we have rephrased the output (l̂i′,1, . . . , l̂i′,T ) as computing the answers to nkT
(adaptively chosen) queries on (τ1, . . . , τn), each of which is λ-sensitive to the input τi. Thus
the theorem follows from our choice of b = λε−1
√
8nkT log(1/δ) and Theorems 16 and 14.
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F Proof of the Lower Bound on Error (Theorem 13)
To begin, as an overview of the proof for the reader , we provide a sketch of the proof of
Theorem 13. Let d ∈ {0, 1}n be an n-bit database and Q = {q1, . . . , qn′} be a set of n′
subset-sum queries. For the sketch, assume that we have an algorithm that computes exact
equilibria. We will split the (n + n′) players into n “data players” and n′ “query players.”
Roughly speaking, the data players will have utility functions that force them to play “0” or
“1”, so that their actions actually represent the database d. Each of the query players will
represent a subset-sum query q, and we will try to set up their utility function in such a way
that it forces them to take an action that corresponds to an approximate answer to q(d).
In order to do this, first assume there are n + 1 possible actions, denoted
{
0, 1
n
, 2
n
, . . . , 1
}
.
We can set up the utility function so that for each action a, he receives a payoff that is
maximized when an a fraction of the data players in q are playing 1. That is, when playing
action a, his payoff is maximized when q(d) = a. Conversely, he will play the action a
that is closest to the true answer q(d). Thus, we can read off the answer to q from his
equilibrium action. Using each of the n′ query players to answer a different query, we can
compute answers to n′ queries. Finally, notice that joint differential privacy says that all of
the actions of the query players will satisfy (standard) differential privacy with respect to
the inputs of the data players, thus the answers we read off will be differentially private (in
the standard sense) with respect to the database.
This sketch does not address two important issues. The first is that we do not assume
that the algorithm computes an exact equilibrium, only that it computes an approximate
equilibrium. This relaxation means that the data players do not have to play the correct
bit with probability 1, and the query players do not have to choose the answer that exactly
maximizes their utility. Below, we show that the error in the answers we read off is only a
small factor larger than the error in the equilibrium computed.
The second is that we do not want to assume that the (query) players have n+1 available
actions. Instead, we use log n players per query, and use each to compute roughly one bit
of the answer, rather than the whole answer. However, if the query players’ utility actually
depends on a specific bit of the answer, then a single data player changing his action might
result in a large change in utility. Below, we show how to compute bits of the answer using
1/n-sensitive utility functions.
Given a database D ∈ {0, 1}n, D = (d1, . . . , dn) and n′ queries Q = {q1, . . . , qn′}, we will
construct the following N -player 2-action game where N = n+n′ logn. We denote the set of
actions for each player by A = {0, 1}. We also use {(j, h)}j∈[n′],h∈[logn] to denote the n′ log n
players {n+ 1, . . . , n+ n′ log n}. For intuition, think of player (j, h) as computing the h-th
bit of qj(D).
We fix the type profile τ ∈ T n. Each player i ∈ [n] has the utility function
u(τi, a) =
{
1 if ai = di
0 otherwise
That is, player i receives utility 1 if they play the action matching the i-th entry in D, and
utility 0 otherwise. Clearly, these are 0-sensitive utility functions because it is independent
of each player’s type.
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The specification of the utility functions for the query players (j, h) is somewhat more
complicated. First, we define the functions fh, gh : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] as
fh(x) = 1− min
r∈{0,...,2h−1−1}
∣∣x− (2−(h+1) + r2−(h−1))∣∣
gh(x) = 1− min
r∈{0,...,2h−1−1}
∣∣x− (2−h + 2−(h+1) + r2−(h−1))∣∣
Each (j, h) player will have the utility function based on her type τ(j,h)
u(τ(j,h), (0, a−(j,h))) = fh(qj(a1, . . . , an))
u(τ(j,h), (1, a−(j,h))) = gh(qj(a1, . . . , an))
Since q(a1, . . . , an) is defined to be 1/n-sensitive in the actions a1, . . . , an, and fh, gh are
1-Lipschitz, u(τ(j,h), ·) is also 1/n-sensitive. This means that the described game is 1/n
large.
Also notice that since Q is part of the definition of the game, we can simply define the
types space to be all those we have given to the players. For the data players we only used
2 distinct types, and each of the n′ logn query players may have a distinct type. Thus we
only need the set T to have n′ log n+ 2 types in order to implement the reduction.
Now we can analyze the structure of α-approximate equilibrium in this game, and show
how, given any equilibrium set of strategies for the query players, we can compute a set of
O(α)-approximate answers to the set of queries Q.
We start by claiming that in any α-approximate CCE, every data player plays the action
di in most rounds. Specifically,
Claim 2. Let π be any distribution over AN that constitutes an α-approximate CCE of the
game described above. Then for every data player i,
P
π
[ai 6= di] ≤ α.
Proof.
P
π
[ai 6= di] = 1− E
π
[u(τi, (ai, a−i))]
≤ 1−
(
E
π
[u(τi, (di, a−i))]− α
)
(Definition of α-approximate CCE)
= 1− (1− α) = α (Definition of u(τi, ·)) (19)
The next claim asserts that if we view the actions of the data players, a1, . . . , an, as a
database, then q(a1, . . . , an) is close to q(d1, . . . , dn) on average.
Claim 3. Let π be any distribution over AN that constitutes an α-approximate CCE of the
game described above. Let S ⊆ [n] be any subset-sum query. Then
E
π
[|q(d1, . . . , dn)− q(a1, . . . , an)|] ≤ α.
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Proof.
E
π
[|q(d1, . . . , dn)− q(a1, . . . , an)|] = E
π
[
1
n
∑
i∈S
(di − ai)
]
≤ 1
n
∑
i∈S
E
π
[|di − ai|] = 1
n
∑
i∈S
P
π
[ai 6= di]
≤ 1
n
∑
i∈S
α ≤ α (Claim 2, S ⊆ [n]) (20)
We now prove a useful lemma that relates the expected utility of an action (under any
distribution) to the expected difference between qj(a1, . . . , an) and qj(D).
Claim 4. Let µ be any distribution over AN . Then for any query player (j, h),∣∣∣∣Eµ [u(τ(j,h), (0, a−(j,h)))]− fh(qj(D))
∣∣∣∣ ≤ Eµ [|qj(a1, . . . , an)− qj(D)|] , and∣∣∣∣Eµ [u(τ(j,h), (1, a−(j,h)))]− gh(qj(D))
∣∣∣∣ ≤ Eµ [|qj(a1, . . . , an)− qj(D)|] .
Proof. We prove the first assertion, the proof of the second is identical.∣∣∣∣Eµ [u(τ(j,h), (0, a−(j,h)))]− fh(qj(D))
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣Eµ [fh(qj(a1, . . . , an))− fh(qj(D))]
∣∣∣∣
≤ E
µ
[|qj(a1, . . . , an)− qj(D)|] (fh is 1-Lipschitz) (21)
The next claim, which establishes a lower bound on the expected utility player (j, h) will
obtain for playing a fixed action, is an easy consequence of Claims 3 and 4.
Claim 5. Let π be any distribution over AN that constitutes an α-approximate CCE of the
game described above. Then for every query player (j, h),∣∣∣E
π
[
u(τ(j,h), (0, a−(j,h)))
]− fh(qj(D))∣∣∣ ≤ α, and∣∣∣E
π
[
u(τ(j,h), (1, a−(j,h)))
]− gh(qj(D))∣∣∣ ≤ α.
Now we state a simple fact about the functions fh and gh. Informally, this asserts that
we can find alternating intervals of width nearly 2−h, that nearly partition [0, 1], in which
fh(x) is significantly larger than gh(x) or vice versa.
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Observation 1. Let β ≤ 2−(h+1). If
x ∈
⋃
r∈{0,1,...,2h−1−1}
(
r2−h + β, (r + 1)2−h − β)
then fh(x) > gh(x) + β. We denote this region Fh,β. Similarly, if
x ∈
⋃
r∈{0,1,...,2h−1−1}
(
(r + 1)2−h + β, (r + 2)2−h − β)
then gh(x) > fh(x) + β. We denote this region Gh,β
For example, when h = 3, F3,β = [0,
1
8
−β]∪ [2
8
+β, 3
8
−β]∪ [4
8
+β, 5
8
−β]∪ [6
8
+β, 7
8
−β].
By combining this fact, with Claim 5, we can show that if qj(D) falls in the region Fh,α, then
in an α-approximate CCE, player (j, h) must be playing action 0 ‘often’.
Claim 6. Let π be any distribution over AN that constitutes an α-approximate CCE of the
game described above. Let j ∈ [n′] and 2−h ≥ 10α. Then, if qj(D) ∈ Fh,9α, Pπ [ai = 0] ≥ 2/3.
Similarly, if qj(D) ∈ Gh,9α, then Pπ [ai = 1] ≥ 2/3.
Proof. We prove the first assertion. The proof of the second is identical. If player (j, h)
plays the fixed action 0, then, by Claim 5,
E
π
[
u(τ(j,h), (0, a−(j,h)))
] ≥ fh(qj(D))− α.
Thus, if π is an α-approximate CCE, player (j, h) must receive at least fh(qj(D))−2α under
π. Assume towards a contradiction that P
[
a(j,h) = 0
]
< 2/3. We can bound player (j, h)’s
expected utility as follows:
E
a∼π
[
u(τ(j,h), a)
]
= P
[
a(j,h) = 0
]
E
π|a(j,h)=0
[
u(τ(j,h), (0, a−(j,h)))
]
+ P
[
a(j,h) = 1
]
E
π|a(j,h)=1
[
u(τ(j,h), (1, a−(j,h)))
]
≤ P [a(j,h) = 0](fh(qj(D)) + E
π|a(j,h)=0
[|qj(a1, . . . , an)− qj(D)|]
)
+ P
[
a(j,h) = 1
](
gh(qj(D)) + E
π|a(j,h)=1
[|qj(a1, . . . , an)− qj(D)|]
)
(22)
= fh(qj(D)) + E
π
[|qj(a1, . . . , an)− qj(D)|]− P
[
a(j,h) = 1
]
(fh(qj(D))− gh(qj(D)))
≤ fh(qj(D)) + α− 9αP
[
a(j,h) = 1
]
(23)
< fh(qj(D))− 2α (24)
Line (22) follows from the Claim 4 (applied to the distributions π | a(j,h) = 0 and π | a(j,h) =
1). Line (23) follows from Claim 3 (applied to the expectation in the second term) and the
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fact that qj(D) ∈ Fh,9α (applied to the difference in the final term). Line (24) follows from
the assumption that P
[
a(j,h) = 0
]
< 2/3. Thus we have established a contradiction to the
fact that π is an α-approximate CCE.
Given the previous claim, the rest of the proof is fairly straightforward. For each query
j, we will start at h = 1 and consider two cases: If player (j, 1) plays 0 and 1 with roughly
equal probability, then we must have that qj(D) 6∈ F1,9α ∪ G1,9α. It is easy to see that this
will confine qj(D) to an interval of width 18α, and we can stop. If player (j, 1) does play
one action, say 0, a significant majority of the time, then we will know that qj(D) ∈ F1,9α,
which is an interval of width 1/2− 9α. However, now we can consider h = 2 and repeat the
case analysis: Either (j, 2) does not significantly favor one action, in which case we know
that qj(D) 6∈ F2,9α ∪G2,9α, which confines qj(D) to the union of two intervals, each of width
18α. However, only one of these intervals will be contained in F1,9α, which we know contains
qj(D). Thus, if we are in this case, we have learned qj(D) to within 18α and can stop.
Otherwise, if player (j, 2) plays, say, 0 a significant majority of the time, then we know that
qj(D) ∈ F1,9α ∩ F2,9α, which is an interval of width 1/4 − 9α. It is not too difficult to see
that we can repeat this process as long as 2−h ≥ 18α, and we will terminate with an interval
of width at most 36α that contains qj(D).
G Computing Equilibria in Games with Many Actions
In this section we construct and algorithm for computing equilibria in games with many
actions but bounded type spaces. First, we will formally state the privacy and accuracy
guarantees of the Median Mechanism (see (Roth & Roughgarden 2010, Hardt & Rothblum
2010)).
Theorem 17 (Median Mechanism For General Queries). Consider the following R-round
experiment between a mechanism MM , who holds a tuple τ1, . . . , τn ∈ T , and an adaptive
querier B. For every round r = 1, 2, . . . , R:
1. B(Q1, a1, . . . , Qr−1, ar−1) = Qr, where Qr is a λ-sensitive query.
2. ar ∼MM(τ1, . . . , τn;Qr).
For every ε, δ, λ, β ∈ (0, 1], n, R, |T | ∈ N, there is a mechanism MM such that for every B
1. The transcript (Q1, a1, . . . , QR, aR) satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy.
2. With probability 1− β (over the randomizations of MM), |ar−Qr(τ1, . . . , τn)| ≤ αMM
for every r = 1, 2, . . . , R and for
αMM = 16ε
−1λ
√
n log |T | log(2R/β) log(4/δ).
G.1 Noisy No-Regret via the Median Mechanism
We now define our algorithm for computing equilibria in games with exponentially many
actions.
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To keep notation straight, we will use τ = (τ1, . . . , τn) to denote the types of all the n
players.
First we sketch some intuition for how the mechanism works. In particular, why we cannot
simply substitute the Median Mechanism for the Laplace mechanism and get a better error
bound. Recall the queries we used in analyzing the Laplace-based algorithm NR-LAPLACE
in the Proof of Theorem 10. We were able to argue that fixing τ−i and the previous noisy
losses, the query was low-sensitivity as a function of its input τi. This argument relied on the
fact that we were effectively running independent copies of the Laplace mechanism, which
guarantees that the answers given to each query do not explicitly depend on the previous
queries that were asked (although the queries themselves may be correlated). However, in the
mechanism we are about to define, the queries are all answered using a single instantiation of
the Median Mechanism. The Median Mechanism correlates its answers across queries, and
thus the answers to one query may depend on the previous queries that were made. This
fact will be problematic, because the description of the queries contains the types τ−i. Thus,
the queries we made to construct the output for players other than i will actually contain
information about τ−i, and we cannot guarantee that this information does not leak into the
answers given to other sets of players.
We address this problem by asking a larger set of queries whose description does not
depend on any particular player’s type. We will make the set of queries large enough that
they will actually contain every query that we might possibly have asked in NR-LAPLACE, and
each player can select from the larger set of answers only those which she needs to compute
her losses. Since the queries do not depend on any type, we do not have to worry about
leaking the description of the queries.
In order to specify the mechanism it will be easier to define the following family of queries
first. Let i be any player, j any action, t any round of the algorithm, and τˆ any type in
T . The queries will be specified by these parameters and a sequence Λ1, . . . ,Λt−1 where
Λt′ ∈ Rn×k×|T | for every 1 ≤ t′ ≤ t − 1. Intuitively, the query is given a description of the
“state” of the mechanism in all previous rounds. Each state variable Λt encodes the losses
that would be experienced by every possible player i and every action j and every type τˆ ,
given that the previous t − 1 rounds of the mechanism were played using the real vector of
types. We will think of the variables Λ1, . . . ,Λt−1 as having been previously sanitized, and
thus we do not have to worry about the fact that these state variables encode information
about the actual types of the players.
Qji,t,τˆ (τ1, . . . , τn | Λ1, . . . ,Λt−1)
Using τ1, . . . , τn | Λ1, . . . ,Λt−1, compute lji,t,τˆ = 1− Eπ−i,t [u(τi, (j, a−i))].
This computation can be done in the following steps:
1. For every i′ 6= i, use Λji′,1,τi′ , . . . ,Λ
j
i′,t−1,τi′ , A, and τi′ to compute πi′,1, . . . , πi′,t−1.
2. Using π−i,t−1, compute l
j
i,t,τˆ .
Observe that Qji,t,τˆ is λ-sensitive for every player i, step t, action j, and type τˆ . To see
why, consider what happens when a specific player i′ switches her input from τi′ to τ ′i′ . In
that case that i = i′, this has no effect on the query answer, because player i’s utility is never
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used in computing Qji,t,τˆ . In the case that i
′ 6= i then the type of player i′ can (potentially)
affect the computation of πi′,t−1, and can (potentially) change it to an arbitrary state πi′,t−1.
But then λ-sensitivity follows from the λ-sensitivity of u(τi, ·), the definition of lji,t,τˆ , and
linearity of expectation. Notice that τi′ does not, however, affect the state of any other
players, who will use the losses Λ1, . . . ,Λt−1 to generate their states, not the actual states of
the other players.
Now that we have this family of queries in places, we can describe the algorithm. Our
mechanism uses two steps. At a high level, there is an inner mechanism, NRMEDIAN-SHARED,
that will use the Median Mechanism to answer each query Qji,t,τˆ
(
· | Λ̂1, . . . , Λ̂t−1
)
, and will
output a set of noisy losses Λ̂1, . . . , Λ̂T . The properties of the Median Mechanism will guaran-
tee that these losses satisfy (ε, δ)-differential privacy (in the standard sense of Definition 5).
There is also an outer mechanism that takes these losses and, for each player, uses the
losses corresponding to her type to run a no-regret algorithm. This is NRMEDIAN which takes
the sequence Λ̂1, . . . , Λ̂T and using the type τi will compute the equilibrium strategy for
player i. Since each player’s output can be determined only from her own type and a set
of losses that is (ε, δ)-differentially private with respect to every type, the entire mechanism
will satisfy (ε, δ)-joint differential privacy. This follows from the Billboard Lemma (Lemma
8).
Algorithm 7 Inner Mechanism
procedure NRMEDIAN-SHAREDA(τ1, . . . τn)
Parameters ε, δ, λ ∈ (0, 1] and n, k, T ∈ [n]
for t = 1, 2, . . . , T do
Let: l̂ji,t,τˆ =MM
(
τ1, . . . , τn;Q
j
i,t,τˆ (· | Λ̂1, . . . , Λ̂t−1)
)
for every i, j, τˆ .
Let: Λ̂j(i, t, τˆ) = l̂ji,t,τˆ for every i, j, τˆ .
return (Λ̂1, . . . , Λ̂T ).
end procedure
Algorithm 8 Outer Mechanism
procedure NRMEDIANA(τ1, . . . τn)
Parameters: ε, δ,∆ ∈ (0, 1], n, k, T ∈ [n]
Let: (Λ̂1, . . . , Λ̂T ) = NRMEDIAN-SHARED
A(τ1, . . . , τn).
for i = 1, . . . , n do
Let: πi,1 be the uniform distribution over {1, 2, . . . , k}.
for t = 1, . . . , T do
Let: πi,t = A
(
πi,t−1, Λ̂i,t−1,τi
)
return to player i: (πi,1, . . . , πi,T ).
end procedure
Theorem 18 (Privacy of NRMEDIAN). The algorithm NRMEDIAN satisfies (ε, δ)-joint differen-
tial privacy.
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Proof. We let M be NRMEDIAN-SHARED and write o =M(τ). Observe that the output of
NRMEDIAN can be written as M′(τ) = (f1(τ1, o), . . . , fn(τn, o)) where fi depends only on τi
for every player i where fi is the i-th iteration of the main loop in NRMEDIAN. The privacy of
the Median Mechanism (Theorem 17) directly implies that M is (ε, δ)-differentially private
(in the standard sense).
We use the Billboard Lemma to then say thatM′(τ) = (f1(τ1,M(τ)), · · · , fn(τn,M(τ)))
is (ǫ, δ) joint differentially private.
G.2 Computing Approximate Equilibria
Theorem 19 (Computing CE). Let A be Aswap. Fix the environment, i.e the number of
players n, the number of actions k, number of possible types |T |, largeness of the game λ
and desired privacy (ǫ, δ). Suppose β and T are such that:
16ε−1λ
√
n log |T | log(2|T |nkT/β) log(4/δ) ≤ 1
6
(25)
Then with probability at least 1 − β the algorithm NRMEDIANAfixed returns an α-approximate
CE for:
α = O˜
(
λ
√
n log3/2(|T |) log(k/β) log(1/δ)
ε
)
.
Again, considering ‘low sensitivity’ games where λ is O(1/n), the theorem says that
fixing the desired degree of privacy, we can compute an α-approximate equilibrium for α =
O˜
(
log
3
2 (|T |) log k√
n
)
. The tradeoff to the old results is in dependence on the number of actions.
The results in the previous section had a
√
k dependence on the number of actions k. This
would have no bite if k grew even linearly in n. We show that positive results still exist if the
number of possible private types is is bounded - the dependence on the number of actions
and the number of types is now logarithmic. However this comes with two costs. First, we
can only consider situations where the number of types any player could have is bounded,
and grows sub-exponentially in n. Second, we lose computational tractability– the running
time of the Median Mechanism is exponential in the number of players in the game.
Proof of Theorem 19. By the accuracy guarantees of the Median Mechanism:
P
MM
[
∃i, t, j, τˆ s.t.
∣∣∣l̂ji,t,τˆ − lji,t,τˆ ∣∣∣ > αMM ] ≤ β
where
αMM = 16λε
−1√n log |T | log(2|T |nkT/β) log(4/δ)
By (25), αMM ≤ 1/6. Therefore,
P
MM
[
∃i, j, t, τˆ s.t. |l̂ji,t,τˆ − lji,t,τˆ | > 16
]
≤ β
58
Applying Theorem 1 and substituting αMM , we obtain:
P
Z
[
∃i s.t. ρ(πi,1, . . . , πi,T , L,Fswap) >
√
2k log k
T
+ 2αMM
]
≤ β
Now we can choose
√
T = k(λ
√
n)−1 to conclude the proof.
H Additional Related Work
The most well studied problem is that of accurately answering numeric-valued queries on a
data set. A basic result of (Dwork, McSherry, Nissim & Smith 2006) is that any low sensi-
tivity query (i.e. the addition or removal of a single entry can change the value of the query
by at most 1) can be answered efficiently and (ǫ-differential) privately while introducing only
O(1/ǫ) error. Another fundamental result of (Dwork, Kenthapadi, McSherry, Mironov & Naor
2006, Dwork et al. 2010) is that differential privacy composes gracefully. Any algorithm
composed of T subroutines, each of which are O(ǫ)-differentially private, is itself
√
Tǫ-
differentially private. Combined, these give an efficient algorithm for privately answering
any T low sensitivity queries with O(
√
T ) effort, a result which we make use of.
Using computationally inefficient algorithms, it is possible to privately answer queries
much more accurately (Blum et al. 2008, Dwork et al. 2010, Roth & Roughgarden 2010,
Hardt & Rothblum 2010, Gupta et al. 2011, 2012). Combining the results of the latter two
yields an algorithm which can privately answer arbitrary low sensitivity queries as they ar-
rive, with error that scales only logarithmically in the number of queries. We use this when
we consider games with large action spaces.
Our lower bounds for privately computing equilibria use recent information theoretic
lower bounds on the accuracy queries can be answered while preserving differential privacy
(Dinur & Nissim 2003, Dwork et al. 2007, Dwork & Yekhanin 2008, De 2012). Namely, we
construct games whose equilibria encode answers to large numbers of queries on a database.
Variants of differential privacy related to joint differential privacy have been considered in
the setting of query release, specifically for analyst privacy (Dwork et al. 2012). Specifically,
the definition of one-analyst-to-many-analyst privacy used by (Hsu et al. 2013) can be seen
as an instantiation of joint differential privacy.
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